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I. INTRODUCTION

This Article argues that antiestablishmentarianism, which in the United States is equivalent to the separation of church and state,2 is a fundamental prerequisite for the protection of religious rights under international human rights law. It asserts that the existence of state religions violates international human rights norms, and therefore that a country with an established religion must disestablish the religion from the state in order to come
into compliance with international human rights treaty obligations.3 For
purposes of this Article, a state religion is a religion that has been adopted
by a national government as the official religion of that country. Of course,
the term religion poses significant challenges in defining its meaning and
scope. Since this Article studies state religions which tend to be widely
recognized religions (see those noted in the next paragraph), it does not
attempt to delineate what practices would be included within and excluded

2.
THE SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE: WRITINGS ON A FUNDAMENTAL
FREEDOM BY AMERICA’S FOUNDERS 124-30 (Forrest Church ed., Beacon Press 2004). In this
Article, the term “church” is defined broadly to include all religions.
3.
Unless otherwise indicated, this Article uses the terms “state,” “nation,” and
“country” interchangeably.
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from the scope of “religion” at the margins.4 Distinctions are sometimes
drawn between “state religion” as describing countries that have adopted a
religion that is governed by a separate religious hierarchy (e.g., Costa Rica
has established Roman Catholicism, which is governed by the Vatican, as
its official state religion), “state church” as describing countries that have
created their own national church (e.g., Norway established the Church of
Norway), “theocracy” as describing countries in which the religious entity
controls the government (e.g., the Islamic Republic of Iran), or similar categorizations. This Article uses the terms “state religion,” “established religion,” “official religion,” and similar phrases to encompass all such forms
of formalized church-state relationships. It will also examine some states
that have de facto state religions, such as Russia, as well as de jure state
religions.
State religions exist in various forms in countries throughout the
world.5 According to one report, seventy-five countries out of 188 included
in the study (forty percent) had state religions in 2000.6 Examples7 of countries maintaining an established religion include Costa Rica (Roman Catholic),8 Denmark (Lutheran),9 Israel (Jewish),10 Greece (Eastern Orthodox),11

4.
Jónatas E.M. Machado, Freedom of Religion: A View from Europe, 10 ROGER
WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 451, 476-85 (2005) (providing a good discussion of the difficulties of
defining religion).
5.
For an overview of the historical context and current relationship between the
church and state in Europe, see John T.S. Madeley, A Framework for the Comparative Analysis of Church-State Relations in Europe, 26 W. EUR. POL. 23 (2003). See also Tahir
Mahmood, Religion in Contemporary Legal Systems, 2011 BYU L. Rev. 605, 605-07 (2011)
(referencing “the proclamation of a particular religion as the state or otherwise privileged
religion in numerous countries of Asia and Africa” and that “the tradition that is accorded
the status of state religion in the largest number of modern-day nations is Islam. In as many
as sixty nation-states situated on the continents of Asia, Africa, and Europe, followers of
Islam are in a majority. Constitutional documents in twenty-four of these countries . . . proclaim Islam to be their state religion . . . .”).
6.
Robert J. Barro & Rachel M. McClearly, Which Countries Have State Religions? 7 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper Series, April 2004).
7.
Id. at 43, 45.
8.
POLITICAL CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF COSTA RICA tit. VI, art. 75,
available at www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=219959 (“The Roman Catholic and
Apostolic Religion is the religion of the State, which contributes to its preservation, without
preventing the free exercise in the Republic of other forms of worship that do not contravene
universal morality or good customs.”).
9.
THE CONST. ACT OF DENMARK, pt. 1, § 4, available at
http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=178670 (“The Evangelical-Lutheran
Church of Denmark (Folkekirken) is the established Church of Denmark and, as such, is
supported by the State.”).
10.
Asher Maoz, Religious Human Rights in the State of Israel, in RELIGIOUS
HUMAN RIGHTS IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE: LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 349, 357 (Johan D. van der
Vyver & John Witte, Jr. eds., 1996) (“Israel was established as a Jewish state.”).
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Jordan (Muslim),12 Thailand (Buddhist),13 United Kingdom (Anglican in
England and Presbyterian in Scotland),14 and Zambia (Christian).15
The relationship between the government16 and the official religious
entity varies from country to country. For example, the constitutions of
certain countries formally establish the state religion.17 Even in some countries that have taken steps to disestablish their official church-state relationship, significant ties remain between the religious institutions and the national governments that indicate a de facto state religion persists, such as in
Russia.18
11.
THE CONSTITUTION OF GREECE, art. 3, § 1, available at
http://www.hri.org/docs/syntagma/artcl25.html (“The prevailing religion in Greece is that of
the Eastern Orthodox Church of Christ.”).
12.
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE HASHEMITE KINGDOM OF JORDAN ch. 1, art. 2, available at http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=227813 (“Islam is the religion of
the State.”).
13.
CONSTITUTION OF THE KINGDOM OF THAILAND pt. 4, § 79, available at
http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=185054 (“The State shall provide patronage
and protection to Buddhism, which is the religion long practised by the majority of the Thai
people, and other religions and shall promote good understanding and harmony amongst
followers of all religions and encourage the application of religious precepts for the purpose
of fostering conscience and developing the quality of life.”).
14.
Johan D. van der Vyver, Introduction: Legal Dimensions of Religious Human
Rights: Constitutional Texts, in RELIGIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE: LEGAL
PERSPECTIVES at xxxvi-xxxvii (Johan D. van der Vyver & John Witte, Jr. eds., 1996) (citing
Submission of the Clergy Act, 1533, 25 Hen. 8, c. 19 (Eng.); Act of Supremacy, 1558, 1
Eliz. I, c. 1 (Eng.); Union with Scotland Act, 1706, 5 Ann, c. 8 (U.K.)).
15.
THE CONSTITUTION OF ZAMBIA, PREAMBLE (“We, the People of Zambia . . .
having solemnly resolved to maintain Zambia as a Sovereign Democratic Republic . . . Declare the Republic a Christian nation while upholding the right of every person to enjoy that
person's freedom of conscience or religion.”). See WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
ORGANIZATION, http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=177164.
16.
Both the “government” and the “state” are complex entities composed of multiple subparts, all of which consist of individual people, with their own religious beliefs,
agendas, and motivations. This Article uses the terms “state” and “government” as imperfect
shorthand methods of representing these multifaceted systems that have evolved to facilitate
the coordination of human societies, with all of their inherent power struggles.
17.
Peter Garde, New Trends in the Position of the Danish National Church as State
Church, 3 EUR. J. FOR CHURCH & ST. RES. 153, 153 (1996) (quoting the DANISH
CONSTITUTION OF 1953 art. 4: “The Evangelic-Lutheran Church is the Danish national
church and as such supported by the state”).
18.
See, e.g., Robert C. Blitt, How to Entrench a De Facto State Church in Russia:
A Guide in Progress, 2008 BYU L. Rev. 707, 726 (“The immediate implications of this
entente [between the Russian government and the Russian Orthodox Church] based on mutual self-interest to the exclusion of others are clear: continued constitutional meltdown and
flaunting of the rule of law by a government unwilling to live up to its people's vision of
Russia or its international commitments, and an emboldened xenophobic de facto state
church.”). See also T. Jeremy Gunn, The Law of the Russian Federation on the Freedom of
Conscience and Religious Associations from a Human Rights Perspective, in PROSELYTISM
AND ORTHODOXY IN RUSSIA: THE NEW WAR FOR SOULS 239-64 (John Witte, Jr. & Michael
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The doctrine of antiestablishmentarianism calls into question arrangements establishing an official state religion, particularly in light of the international human rights framework.19 Despite the benefits that an established church may bring to some people, state religions violate internationally recognized human rights in a number of ways. International human
rights law protects numerous facets of religious rights,20 including nondiscrimination and equality on the basis of religion, the right to freedom of
religious belief and practice, the right of parents to raise their children in
accordance with their religious beliefs, and the right to change one’s religious affiliation and belief. Maintaining an official state religion discriminates against people holding minority beliefs by placing the moral authority
of the state in support of the official religion, and therefore either implicitly
or explicitly against other religious practices or beliefs. It may also discriminate against minorities in more tangible ways, as in the distribution of government benefits.21 An official state religion may be used to justify govBordeaux eds., 1999). For an analysis of the movement toward disestablishment in Finland,
see generally Elizabeth Christensen, Is the Lutheran Church Still the State Church? An
Analysis of Church-State Relations in Finland, 1995 BYU L. Rev. 585 (“The changes in the
organization of church-state relations proposed by the ecclesiastical law of the 1990s [which
were subsequently adopted] gives the Church more independence from the state and more
individual power, but it does not remove the permanent ties that bind the Church to the Finnish state nor those that bind the State to the Church.”). Moreover, according to the new Finnish Constitution adopted in 1999: “Section 76 - The Church Act: Provisions on the organisation and administration of the Evangelic Lutheran Church are laid down in the Church Act.
The legislative procedure for enactment of the Church Act and the right to submit legislative
proposals relating to the Church Act are governed by the specific provisions in that Code.”
THE CONSTITUTION OF FINLAND June 11, 1999, available at
http://www.finlex.fi/en/laki/kaannokset/1999/en19990731.pdf.
19.
Machado, supra note 4, at 520 (“Separation of religious communities and the
State means a normative, institutional, symbolic and financial separation.”).
20.
Under international human rights norms, religious rights include the right to
adopt agnosticism and atheism. See U.N. Human Rights Committee, CCPR General Comment No. 22: Article 18 (Freedom of Thought, Conscience or Religion), ¶ 2, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.4 (July 30, 1993), available at
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.4. (“Article
18 protects theistic, non-theistic and atheistic beliefs, as well as the right not to profess any
religion or belief.”). See also Michael J. Perry, A Right to Religious Freedom? The Universality of Human Rights, the Relativity of Culture, 10 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 385, 397
n.26 (2005) (“Although the ICCPR does not itself define ‘religion or belief’ there is extensive guidance in the travaux, as well as from the bodies monitoring ICCPR’s implementation
. . . it is clear that Article 18 of the ICCPR protects both religious and nonreligious forms of
belief. Thus it protects the right to hold a belief as well as the right to refrain from adopting
any religion or belief. Comprehended within this right is the right to choose, change or retain
the religion or belief of one’s choice.”) (citing KAREN MUSALO, UNITED NATIONS HIGH
COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, CLAIMS FOR PROTECTION BASED ON RELIGION OR BELIEF:
ANALYSIS AND PROPOSED CONCLUSIONS, U.N. Doc. PPLA/2002/01 (2002)).
21.
Carolyn Evans & Christopher A. Thomas, Church-State Relations in the European Court of Human Rights, 2006 BYU L. Rev. 699, 713-19.
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ernmental interference with the religious entity, such as the appointment of
religious leaders22 and owning church property, thus intruding upon the
religious freedom of those who adhere to the state religion.23 The government may attempt to impose the state religion upon its inhabitants, for instance, through compulsory religious education of children. Additionally,
the government’s provision of certain benefits only to adherents to the state
religion may inhibit them from changing their professed religion. Interestingly, however, antiestablishmentarianism is not yet widely considered to
be a necessary prerequisite for the protection of religious rights under international human rights instruments as they have been interpreted thus far by
the entities that oversee their implementation, or by the international community in general.24 Moreover, some scholars have explicitly affirmed their
view that a state religion per se does not conflict with international human
rights.25
This Article underscores the importance of the separation of church
and state as an essential precondition for the protection of religious rights
under the international human rights framework.26 In other words, it argues
that states maintaining an established religion are in violation of internationally recognized human rights and that disestablishment is necessary in
order to comply with international human rights norms.27 Part II reviews
examples of human rights principles that protect religious rights that are
embodied in international instruments and how these rights are violated
through state religions. Part III considers additional concerns that are raised
by the establishment of a state religion. It emphasizes the harms caused by
22.
Garde, supra note 17, at 166 (noting that in Denmark, the Department of Ecclesiastical Affairs within the government appoints clergymen, and the king appoints deans and
bishops).
23.
Evans & Thomas, supra note 21, at 713-19.
24.
Madeley, A Framework for the Comparative Analysis of Church-State Relations
in Europe, supra note 5, at 48 (“It is noteworthy that . . . neutrality of state orientation de
jure and state non-interference de facto, only finally began to come into its own across Europe in the 1990s, when under the impact of the collapse of communism some five of the
Continent’s 50 or so territories opted for it. In none of these five, on the other hand, would
the church-state arrangements, which have been instituted in recent years, pass muster in the
US Supreme Court, but then . . . nation states such as most European states . . . provide very
different contexts to those of immigrant societies such as the USA.”).
25.
Garde, supra note 16, at 174 (citing L.A. Rehoe & T. Trier, Menneskeret,
HUMAN RIGHTS 277 (1990)). It is heartening to note that the opposite view, however, is
recently starting to gain a toehold. See Jeroen Temperman, Are State Churches Contrary to
International Law?, 2:1 OXFORD J. OF L. AND RELIGION (2013) (forthcoming).
26.
Machado, supra note 4, at 522 (noting that a goal of separation “removes state
coercion or endorsement from the realm of religion, considering religious choice and conviction too important to be proscribed or prescribed by the State”).
27.
Id. at 526 (stating that separation prevents state interference with religion
through carrots (money, privilege, power) and sticks (coercion, command, censorship, etc.)).
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state religions and outlines the role of the state in a pluralistic, democratic
society. Part IV examines pronouncements by international human rights
bodies that while aspects of state religions have encroached upon religious
rights, state religions in themselves do not. It suggests that those entities do
not go far enough in their critique of the church-state relationship in many
countries. Part V discusses the movement by the international community
toward antiestablishmentarianism, including countries that have recently
disestablished, disavowing an official state religion. This section suggests
that religious rights are not capable of being entirely fulfilled in countries
maintaining a state religion and calls upon human rights proponents to challenge the compatibility of a state religion itself with human rights. The Article concludes that religious rights will be better protected if the international human rights community explicitly recognizes and affirms the principle of antiestablishmentarianism as a necessary prerequisite for the protection of religious rights within the international human rights framework.
It therefore calls for the international human rights community to adopt the
doctrine of antiestablishmentarianism as a fundamental tenet of religious
rights under the international human rights system.

II. HUMAN RIGHTS CONCERNS POSED BY THE ESTABLISHMENT OF
RELIGION
The adoption by a national government of an official state religion violates numerous human rights principles recognized by the international
community.28 No overarching treaty specifically focuses upon religious
rights.29 Nonetheless, religious rights have been ensconced piecemeal in
several international human rights documents, such as the following:
• Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief
(Declaration on Religion),30
• Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR),31

28.
For an authoritative depiction of the historical participation by religious entities
in the development of the international human rights system, see generally JOHN S. NURSER,
FOR ALL PEOPLES AND ALL NATIONS: THE ECUMENICAL CHURCH AND HUMAN RIGHTS (2005).
29.
Natan Lerner, Religious Human Rights Under the United Nations, in RELIGIOUS
HUMAN RIGHTS IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE: LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 79 (Johan D. van der Vyver
& John Witte, Jr., eds., 1996).
30.
G.A. Res. 36/55, U.N. GAOR, 36th Sess., Supp. No. 51, U.N. Doc. A/36/684
(1981), available at
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/36/55&Lang=E&Area=RES
OLUTION [hereinafter Declaration].
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• International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR),32
• International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights (ICESCR),33 and
• Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC).34
Religious rights are also addressed in regional human rights agreements,35 including:
• European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms (European Convention),36
• American Convention on Human Rights (American Convention),37
• American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man
(American Declaration),38 and

31.
G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 183d plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810
(1948), available at http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/b1udhr.htm [hereinafter
UDHR].
32.
G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16), U.N. Doc. A/6316, at
52 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976). See appendix B for relevant
provisions, available at http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/b3ccpr.htm [hereinafter
ICCPR].
33.
G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16), U.N. Doc. A/6316, at
49 (1966), 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Jan. 3, 1976) [hereinafter ICESCR].
34.
G.A. Res. 44/25, Annex, 44 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 49), U.N. Doc. A/44/49, at
167 (1989), available at http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/44/a44r025.htm (entered into
force Sept. 2 1990) [hereinafter CRC].
35.
Since the Arab Charter on Human Rights offers more circumscribed provisions
on religious freedom and has been criticized for privileging Islam, this treaty is not addressed. See Arab Charter on Human Rights, May 22, 2004 (entered into force Mar. 15,
2008), reprinted in 12 Int'l Hum. Rts. Rep. 893 (2005), available at
http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/loas2005.html.
36.
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms ,
213 U.N.T.S. 222 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1953), available at
http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/z17euroco.html ( amending this treaty are the following: Protocols 2 (ETS No. 44), 3 (ETS No. 45), 5 (ETS No. 55), 8 (ETS No. 118), and 11
(ETS No. 155), which entered into force May 18, 1954, Sept. 21, 1970, Dec. 20, 1971, Jan.
1, 1990, and May 11, 1994, respectively) [hereinafter European Convention].
37.
American Convention on Human Rights, art. 12, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144
U.N.T.S. 123 (entered into force July 18, 1978), available at
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/showDetails.aspx?objid=08000002800f10e1 (noting that the
article addressing religious freedom closely tracks the language set forth in ICCPR) [hereinafter American Convention].
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• African Charter on Human and People’s Rights (African
Charter).39
These instruments, as well as other international and regional documents addressing religious rights, have been ratified or adopted by a significant number of states throughout the world,40 and their norms have
achieved wide acceptance.41 Taken together, these documents recognize
several facets of religious rights.42 Yet, none of the international or regional
human rights documents explicitly includes the concept of antiestablishmentarianism as a necessary precondition to ensuring the full protection of
religious rights.43 The international bodies overseeing their implementation
have likewise exhibited a reluctance to interpret the instruments as necessitating the disestablishment of state religions, as discussed further below.
This subsection will explore examples of human rights violations in greater
detail as illustrations of how nations that establish a state religion may violate fundamental human rights norms.

38.
American Declaration of the Right and Duties of Man, O.A.S. Res. XXX, reprinted in Basic Documents Pertaining to Human Rights in the Inter-American System,
OAS/Ser.L/V/I.4 Rev. 9 (2003); 43 AJIL Supp. 133 (1949), available at
http://www.cidh.oas.org/Basicos/English/Basic2.american%20Declaration.htm [hereinafter
American Declaration].
39.
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights art. 8 (entered into force Oct.
21, 1986), available at
https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%201520/volume-1520-I-26363English.pdf [hereinafter African Charter].
40.
For an overview of the international and regional human rights documents pertaining to religious rights, see NATAN LERNER, RELIGION, SECULAR BELIEFS, AND HUMAN
RIGHTS 13-57, 175-88 (2012); NATAN LERNER, RELIGION, BELIEFS, AND INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS 9-50 (2000). By ratifying human rights instruments, states do not give up
their sovereignty, but rather commit to adhere to the principles set forth in those instruments.
41.
FACILITATING FREEDOM OF RELIGION OR BELIEF: A DESKBOOK, at xlii (Tore
Lindholm, W. Cole Durham, Jr. & Bahia G. Tahzib-Lie eds., 2004).
42.
Religious rights are also mentioned in other international instruments, such as
the 1992 Declaration on the Rights of Minorities and the Convention on the Elimination of
All Forms of Discrimination Against Women. This Article does not attempt to provide a
comprehensive listing of all documents addressing religious rights but, instead, provides an
overview of the rights pertaining to religion highlighted in a few significant examples.
43.
Evans & Thomas, supra note 21, at 699 (“[I]nternational human rights treaties .
. . do not require a particular degree of separation or attachment between religions and the
state and they do not explicitly prohibit establishment.”); John Witte, Jr., A Dickensian Era
of Religious Rights: An Update on Religious Human Rights in Global Perspective, 42 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 707, 766-67 (2001) (“[I]nternational human rights instruments do not mandate the disestablishment of religion or the separation of church and state.”). See also Blitt,
supra note 18, at 726 (“Though not required under international standards, the 1993 Russian Constitution included a provision mandating separation of church and state.” (emphasis
added)).
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TWO CATEGORIES OF PEOPLE WHOSE RELIGIOUS RIGHTS
ARE VIOLATED

Established state religions violate the religious rights of two broad categories of people under the international human rights framework: 1) nonadherents to the state religion and 2) adherents to the state religion.44 While
violations of the rights of non-adherents to the state religion (religious minorities, agnostics, and atheists) may be relatively easy to discern, violations of the religious rights of members of the state religion may be somewhat less intuitive.

1.

Non-adherents to the State Religion

In considering the first category, the rights that are violated with respect to non-adherents to the official state religion may be easily recognizable. Yet even if the state has an official religion that is sanctioned by the
government, one might question whether that inevitably impedes someone
of another faith from practicing her religion within that country—couldn’t
religious rights still be respected? Consider the right to freedom of religious
practice or belief. One could imagine a country with an official state religion that supports its own religion and yet permits, and even encourages,
other religions to flourish within that state—respecting the right to freedom
of religious practice or belief for people who adhere to different religions.45
Therefore, one might wonder what the problem is with state religions in
such circumstances.
In response to this inquiry, freedom of religious practice or belief is
only one of the rights within the category of religious rights under the international human rights framework. In addition to the right to freedom of
religious practice or belief, the rights to equal protection and to nondiscrimination must also be protected. The right to equal protection implies
the right to equal treatment by the state. The right to nondiscrimination
evokes the right not to have the state confer either disadvantages or benefits
on any religion in a discriminatory manner. Considering the fact that, in
many countries with a state religion, the government owns and maintains
44.
Although this Article touches only briefly upon the distinctions between the
religious rights of adherents and nonadherents to the established religion, it will be an interesting topic to explore in a future article.
45.
Christensen, supra note 18, at 599 (“The Church in Finland does not view its
connection with the state as one that infringes on the rights of other religions in Finland. In
his article entitled Church-State Relations in Finland, Juha Seppo suggests that the Church's
relationship with the state is insignificant with regard to other churches. Seppo states, ‘Although the Lutheran and Orthodox churches are in a special position vis-à-vis the State, this
does not as such affect the activities of other religious communities.’” (footnotes omitted)).
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the church property, largely funds the church budget, pays the salary of the
clergy, supports religious education, and so on, one can see that many benefits are provided by the government to the official state religion that are not
provided to those of other faiths. This Article argues that the human rights
community must take into account not only discriminatory treatment as
meaning negative burdens being discriminatorily placed on minority religions, but also as meaning positive benefits that are being discriminatorily
granted to the official state religion and not to the others.

2.

Adherents to the State Religion

This Article also considers the religious rights of the second category
of people—where the rights of adherents to the state religion may also be
infringed upon by virtue of its establishment by the government. Again, the
rights of this group of people may be somewhat less intuitive. For example,
if we consider the right to freedom of religious practice or belief, it may at
first glance seem that an official, government-sponsored and governmentsupported religion would be greatly beneficial for adherents. They may
have the clergy and buildings paid for, a government-supported budget, the
backing of the state for their holidays and celebrations, and state-supported
religious education. Again, one might wonder what the human rights problem is with state religions in such circumstances.46
As is well known, no religion has a single, monolithic set of religious
doctrines or tenets to which every individual within that religion subscribes.47 Consider any religion, place ten people in a room who practice
that religion, and they will have an exciting debate about their varied and
conflicting tenets and beliefs within that religion. Like culture, religion is
not a unified and static system, but is constantly changing and evolving.48
Beliefs that were heretical years ago come into the mainstream, and beliefs
that are mainstream today may not be in the future. Moreover, multiple
beliefs exist at any given moment in time. Therefore, when the state chooses one of those strands of belief and indicates that this is the official view of
the state, doing so violates the religious rights of everyone within that reli46.
See Evans & Thomas, supra note 21, at 707 (arguing that, since “it does not
follow that establishment will necessarily lead to the oppression of religious freedom for
those who do not belong to the established church,” therefore, such establishment is “not . . .
necessarily incompatible” with internationally recognized human rights. Here the authors are
only considering one category of religious rights—religious freedom—and only one category of potential victims—those who do not belong to the established church).
47.
Garde, supra note 17, at 161 (“[T]here are in the Danish National Church, as
probably everywhere, different schools of thought and practice.”).
48.
HUMAN RIGHTS AND RELIGIOUS VALUES: AN UNEASY RELATIONSHIP? vii (Abdullahi A. An-Na’im et al. eds., 1995) (“Religious traditions . . . develop, change and–
sometimes–improve in response to circumstances and in dialogue with their context.”).
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gion who does not adhere to all of the specific religious tenets espoused by
the government.49 The situation becomes even more complex when reflecting upon issues concerning children. Numerous countries have statemandated religious education in their public schools. This is problematic
not only for children within families of other faiths, but also for children
within families who practice the official religion yet who do not subscribe
to all of the interpretations within that religion that are officially espoused
by the state.
B.

EXAMPLES OF RELIGIOUS RIGHTS VIOLATED BY STATE
RELIGIONS

An examination of various components of religious rights strengthens
the argument that church-state separation is necessary to ensure their fulfillment. For example, the right to nondiscrimination on the basis of religion and the right to equality with respect to religion call into question the
propriety of an established state religion. A state’s undue interference with
the religious institution presiding over the official religion violates the freedom of religious belief and practice. Additionally, specific actions that
states might take in relation to the official state religion may also violate
other components of religious rights. For instance, state attempts to mandate religious education in public schools violate the right of parents to
bring up their children in accordance with their religion. State actions that
require people to be of a certain religion in order to be eligible for certain
governmental positions infringes upon the right to change one’s religious
affiliation and belief, or have equal rights to acquire the position in the first
place. This section of the Article will explore examples of widely recognized religious rights, as well as the negative effects that established state
religions have upon those rights, which bolster the argument for disestablishment.

1.

The Right to Nondiscrimination and Equality on the Basis of
Religion

Although certain distinctions exist between the right to nondiscrimination and the right to equality on the basis of religion, they are often viewed
as two sides of the same coin.50 Since the similarities outweigh the differ49.
See Garde, supra note 17, at 162 (describing a case in Norway where the government decided that a bishop had not offended against the creed of the church by repudiating the concept of eternal punishment, which had long been accepted as church doctrine).
50.
The principle of nondiscrimination requires that the government not undertake
actions that would discriminate against people based upon religion. Some human rights
instruments also require governments to take steps to prevent residents within its jurisdiction
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ences for purposes of this Article, this subsection addresses both rights in
conjunction with each other.
Numerous international human rights instruments ensure the right to
be free from discrimination on the basis of religion.51 For example, the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) indicates that every person is entitled to all of the rights and freedoms contained in the declaration
without distinction as to religion.52 The International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR) provides that “the law shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and effective protection against
discrimination on any ground such as . . . religion.”53 Moreover, ICCPR
guarantees that “[i]n those States in which . . . religious . . . minorities exist,
persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with the other members of their group . . . to profess and practice
their own religion.”54 This Article, in conjunction with the nondiscrimination clause, highlights the right of religious minorities to be free
from discrimination by the state on the basis of religion. The International
Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) also guarantees that “the rights enunciated in the present Covenant will be exercised
without discrimination of any kind as to . . . religion.”55 The Declaration on
the Elimination of all Forms of Intolerance of and of the Discrimination
Based on Religion or Belief (Declaration) indicates:
1. No one shall be subject to discrimination by any State,
institution, group of persons, or person on the grounds of
religion or other belief.
2. For the purposes of the present Declaration, the expression “intolerance and discrimination based on religion or
from discriminating on the basis of religion. The principle of equality requires that the government take positive steps to ensure equality under the law based upon religion. For a further discussion of the distinctions between nondiscrimination and equality on the basis of
religion, see Nazila Ghanea, Religion, Equality, and Non-Discrimination, in RELIGION &
HUMAN RIGHTS: AN INTRODUCTION 204-217 (John Witte, Jr. & M. Christian Green eds.,
2012).
51.
One might inquire about religions whose adherents’ beliefs require discrimination against nonadherents. Human rights instruments generally contain limitation clauses,
allowing governments to place limits upon rights to the extent that such limitations are prescribed by law and are necessary to protect public safety, order, health, or morals, or that are
necessary to protect the fundamental rights and freedoms of others. Furthermore, such a
query may illustrate yet another reason to question the compatibility of state religions with
international human rights.
52.
See UDHR, supra note 31, art. 2.
53.
ICCPR, supra note 32, art. 26, art. 2.
54.
Id. art. 27.
55.
ICESCR, supra note 33, art. 2(2).
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belief” means any distinction, exclusion, restriction or
preference based on religion or belief and having as its
purpose or as its effect nullification or impairment of the
recognition, enjoyment or exercise of human rights and
fundamental freedoms on an equal basis.56
The Declaration also specifies:
1. All States shall take effective measures to prevent and
eliminate discrimination on the grounds of religion or belief in the recognition, exercise and enjoyment of human
rights and fundamental freedoms in all fields of civil, economic, political, social and cultural life.
2. All States shall make all efforts to enact or rescind legislation where necessary to prohibit any such discrimination,
and to take all appropriate measures to combat intolerance
on the grounds of religion or other beliefs in this matter.57
In light of the above admonitions, in order to foster nondiscrimination, the state should encourage both religious people and nonreligious people to be tolerant, accepting, and respectful of people who hold
different beliefs.
Regional human rights instruments also ensure the right to be free
from discrimination on the basis of religion. The European Convention
provides that “[t]he enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this
Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as .
. . religion.”58 Moreover, a protocol to the European Convention states that
“the enjoyment of any right set forth by law shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as . . . religion.”59 This right is also protected under the Inter-American Declaration,60 the Inter-American Convention,61 and the African Charter.62

56.
Declaration, supra note 30, art. 2.
57.
Id. art. 4.
58.
European Convention, supra note 36, art. 14.
59.
Protocol No. 12 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedom art. 1, Nov. 4, 2000, E.T.S. No. 177.
60.
See American Declaration, supra note 38, art. II (“All persons are equal before
the law and have the rights and duties established in this Declaration, without distinction as
to . . . creed or any other factor.”).
61.
See American Convention, supra note 37, art. 1(1) (“The States Parties to this
Convention undertake to respect the rights and freedoms recognized herein and to ensure to
all persons subject to their jurisdiction the free and full exercise of those rights and freedoms, without any discrimination for reasons of . . . religion.”).
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Moreover, international human rights instruments also ensure the right
to equality. The UDHR indicates that “[a]ll human beings are born free and
equal in dignity and rights.”63 ICCPR provides that “[a]ll persons are equal
before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to the equal protection of the law,”64 including equality on the basis of religion. The Declaration on Religion affirms the right to equality with respect to religion.65
Regional human rights instruments, including the Inter-American Declaration,66 the Inter-American Convention,67 and the African Charter,68 also
ensure the right to equality under the law. Although some instruments, such
as the UDHR, promote equality in general, most are limited to equal protection of the law. This could either be interpreted narrowly as mandating that
the law must not itself make a distinction among people based upon religion
(which is similar to the non-discrimination principle), or broadly as mandating that the state must use the law to create an environment that fosters
equality among people of differing religious beliefs. A full analysis of these
differing interpretations is outside the scope of this Article; therefore, for
the present purposes, this Article will examine the principle of equality as
being similar to that of nondiscrimination.
In light of these provisions, as well as similar statements in other human rights instruments, the right to nondiscrimination and to equality under
the law on the basis of religion can be considered to be fairly wellrecognized by the international community. How, then, should these rights
apply to the establishment of state religions?
In a hypothetical country where every inhabitant was a member of the
official state religion, and where every adherent to that religion held exactly
the same belief systems about that religion, perhaps a state religion would
not be discriminatory within that country.69 Stated another way, in a country

62.
See African Charter, supra note 39, art. 2 (“Every individual shall be entitled to
the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms recognized and guaranteed in the present Charter
without distinction of any kind such as . . . religion.”).
63.
UDHR, supra note 31, art. 1.
64.
ICCPR, supra note 32, art. 26, art. 2.
65.
See Declaration, supra note 30, art. 2.
66.
See American Declaration, supra note 38, art. II (“All persons are equal before
the law and have the rights and duties established in this Declaration, without distinction as
to . . . creed or any other factor.”).
67.
See American Convention, supra note 37, art. 24 (“All persons are equal before
the law. Consequently, they are entitled, without discrimination, to equal protection of the
law.”).
68.
See African Charter, supra note 39, art. 3 (“1. Every individual shall be equal
before the law. 2. Every individual shall be entitled to equal protection of the law.”).
69.
See Simeon O. Ilesanmi, Disestablishment Without Impartiality: A Case-Study
Examination of the Religious Clauses in the Nigerian Constitution, 85 ST. JOHN’S L. REV.
545, 548-549 (2011) (quoting Michel Rosenfeld, A Pluralist Critique of the Constitutional
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with complete homogeneity, perhaps a state religion may not be problematic. However, such a country does not exist. Historically, the rulers of certain
countries dictated that all inhabitants were members of a particular religion.70 Indeed, unity of religion within a country was seen by many as necessary to maintain unity in support of the government and to ensure the
stability of the country.71 Yet, mandating that all inhabitants adopt the official state religion was obviously a violation of their religious rights (particularly the right to freedom of religion, discussed in the next subsection).
People simply cannot realize the right to freedom of religion and belief
when the state imposes religion.72 Moreover, it is questionable whether
each inhabitant of such countries truly adopted the state religion as his or
her individual belief system and that no one held any differences of opinion
with respect to the religious doctrine espoused by the official state religion.
With the emergence of the modern nation-state, some countries historically may have originated with substantial homogeneity, as the boundaries
of countries were drawn roughly to parallel the boundaries of groups with
common ethnicities, nationalities, and religions. However, such boundaries
were inexact, and therefore, ethnic, national, and religious minorities were
inevitably included within the political boundaries of those countries. In
countries where the existence of multiple religions was acknowledged, rulers and the established religious entity historically have resorted to persecution of minority faiths.73 In some regions of the world, state boundaries

Treatment of Religion, in THE LAW OF RELIGIOUS IDENTITY: MODELS FOR POST-COMMUNISM
39, 44 (Andras Sajo & Shlomo Avineri eds., 1999)).
70.
See Machado, supra note 4, at 455 (stating that in the 1600s, “[a]ll European
States were understood as religious entities, and coercion was seen as a structural part of
religious life . . . Sovereignty . . . was defined as an absolute power over religious factions”);
ROBERT F. DRINAN, CAN GOD & CAESAR COEXIST? BALANCING RELIGIOUS FREEDOM &
INTERNATIONAL LAW 4 (2004) (“For centuries the Church held to the conviction that governments should be required to discourage and even ban not only non-Christian religions but
any version of Christianity that differed from Catholicism.”).
71.
Kimmo Kääriäinen, Religion and State in Finland, 24 (2) NORDIC J. OF
RELIGION AND SOC’Y 155, 156 (2011) (“As in many other countries with state-church systems, the religious homogeneity of the people was seen in Finland as a condition for the
success of the state’s policies of internal integration.”).
72.
See, e.g., Michael A. Rosenthal, Spinoza on Why the Sovereign Can Command
Men’s Tongues but Not Their Minds, in TOLERATION AND ITS LIMITS 54-77 (Melissa S. Williams & Jeremy Waldron eds., 2008).
73.
See Madeley, A Framework for the Comparative Analysis of Church-State Relations in Europe, supra note 5, at 43 (“For most of the early modern period even in the
mixed-religion territories, established churches were upheld as the only officially recognized
cult and adherents of deviant traditions—even where they constituted large majorities of the
population . . .—suffered the consequences of more or less draconian systems of legal persecution.”); Charles J. Reid, Jr., The Fundamental Freedom: Judge John T. Noonan Jr.’s Historiography of Religious Liberty, 83 MARQ. L. REV. 367, 374 (1999) (“Western conceptions
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were not drawn according to the cultural, religious, or ethnic groups of people, leading to religious strife within many of those countries. Conflict between different religious groups within the boundaries of states frequently
persists in modern times. One obvious example is the strife between Orthodox Christian Serbians, Catholic Croatians, and Muslim Bosnians in the
former Yugoslavia, leading to a violent war and breakup of the country.
Considering the increased globalization, immigration, and mobility of
people in present times, the heterogeneity of populations within most, if not
all, countries will almost certainly continue to intensify. In light of this diversity of religious groups within each country, how does the right to nondiscrimination and equal treatment on the basis of religion come into play?
The simple fact that a government proclaims a particular religion to be
the official state religion, without taking any further action, may alone violate the rights to nondiscrimination and to equality on the basis of religion.74
Proclaiming a state religion places the government’s moral stamp of approval on one religion and denies that official stamp of approval to others.75

of religious freedom have emerged from debris of a thousand-year experiment in close
church-state cooperation especially with regard to the oppression of religious dissenters.”).
74.
See Machado, supra note 4, at 523 (“[T]his separation principle is also a precondition of civic equality between all members of the political community. In a free and
democratic society, every citizen should feel as a full member of the political community,
and not as an outsider.”). Some people may claim that the simple fact that a government
proclaims that a country adopts a particular religion as the state religion, without more, is
insignificant and does not cause harm to any of its inhabitants. However, considering how
deeply some people hold their religious beliefs, such a declaration could have a substantial
effect. Consider the following thought experiment: If the United States government were to
declare that the United States has adopted Islam as its official state religion, in name only
and taking no other action, would that declaration make a difference to any of its inhabitants? If so, how? Why might people oppose this move? For instance, people not of the Islamic faith may be concerned that the state is implying that Islam is the only true religion,
and therefore that all other religions are false. See Temperman, supra note 25, at 14-15 (citing to scholars who support similar views such as CORNELIS D. DE JONG, THE FREEDOM OF
THOUGHT, CONSCIENCE AND RELIGION OR BELIEF IN THE UNITED NATIONS 740 (1946-1992)
(Internstentia, 2000); Johan D. van der Vyer, The Relationship of Freedom of Religion or
Belief Norms to Other Human Rights, in FACILITATING FREEDOM OF RELIGION OR BELIEF: A
DESKBOOK 85, 105-06 (Tore Lindholm et al. eds., 2004); Kevin Boyle, Indivisibility of Human Rights, Social Justice and Article 18 of the Universal Declaration, in INNOVATION AND
INSPIRATION: FIFTY YEARS OF THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 131, 146
(Peter Baehr et al. eds., 1999); Paul Marshall, The Nature of Religious Freedom and Religious Persecution, in RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN THE WORLD: A GLOBAL REPORT ON FREEDOM
AND PERSECUTION 15 (Paul Marshall ed. 2000).
75.
Attempts to add a constitutional amendment proclaiming that the United States
is a Christian country signify that the proponents think it would have concrete meaning.
Vermont Senator Ralph Flanders proposed the following as constitutional amendments in
1954:
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The government’s elevation of the status of a favored religion over other
religions may contribute to an atmosphere fostering discriminatory sentiments and actions by people adhering to the officially sanctioned religion
against people who hold minority religious beliefs.76 This situation creates a
society in which a certain religion is privileged and other religions are disadvantaged, in which individuals are given a reason to feel entitled to discriminate on the basis of religion, and in which xenophobia may flourish.77
It is important to note that, even in countries that are tolerant of minority
religions, the imprimatur of the government’s symbolic support privileging
a particular religion over others occurs within a historical context of religious discrimination and inequality.78 The privileged status of the state reli-

Section 1: This nation devoutly recognizes the authority and
law of Jesus Christ, Savior and Ruler of nations, through
whom are bestowed the blessings of Almighty God.
Section 2: This amendment shall not be interpreted so as to
result in the establishment of any particular ecclesiastical
organization, or in the abridgment of the rights of religious
freedom, or freedom of speech and press, or of peaceful
assemblage.
Section 3: Congress shall have power, in such cases as it may
deem proper, to provide a suitable oath or affirmation for
citizens whose religious scruples prevent them from giving
unqualified allegiance to the Constitution as herein amended.
76.
See Arina Lekhel, Leveling the Playing Field for Religious “Liberty” in Russia:
A Critical Analysis of the 1997 Law “On Freedom of Conscience and Religious Associations”, 32 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 167, 203-04 (1999) (discussing Russia’s de facto state
religion, the author notes: “The more serious problem is the distinction between traditional
and non-traditional religions which is apparent in the preamble and which is perpetuated in
the substantive provisions of the new law. In light of the Russian ideal of Orthodox supremacy, intolerance, xenophobia, and radical nationalism, such special recognition of certain
religions in the preamble raises a strong possibility that the endorsement experiment in Russia will not be benign. Thus, the preamble symbolically paves the way for abuse of the rights
of non-traditional religions excluded from the category of “respected” and for discrimination
against religions appearing lower on the list. Potential gross violations of the rights of religious minorities and the equality of the confessions principle compromise Russia's record of
democratization and adherence to international human rights standards”). See also Temperman, supra note 25, at 9-14, 29.
77.
See Machado, supra note 4, at 516 (“Despite notable improvements in religious
freedom and the legal status of minority religious group memberships, the end result of these
regimes is the guarantee of a privileged position for the dominant religion, and the discrimination of minority religious groups.”). See also Temperman, supra note 25, at 9-14.
78.
See Madeley, A Framework for the Comparative Analysis of Church-State Relations in Europe, supra note 5, at 154 (“Unsurprisingly, practical and permanent measures of
religious toleration were first established in the mixed-confession territories, principally in
the eighteenth century. This achievement nowhere took the form of full religious liberty and
equality, however, let alone of a religiously neutral state.”). See also Machado, supra note 4,
at 509 (“[S]eparation of Church and State . . . has become a central tenet of the constitutional
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gion may implicitly conflate the state religion with nationality and ethnicity
(e.g., that citizens of a country are tacitly presumed to be adherents of the
state religion and of a particular ethnic descent),79 which may perpetuate
religious, racial, and ethnic discrimination and stereotypes and mask the
actual diversity within most countries of the world.80 These concerns may
be particularly pronounced for children, who are more vulnerable to discrimination and ostracism by peers.
But even more significantly, it would be difficult (if at all possible) to
find a country in which the proclamation of an official state religion did not
also accompany some type of a distinction in terms of rights or treatment.81
An official state religion may entail discrimination against minority religions in the distribution of government privileges and benefits, including
government subsidies or tax exemptions.82 The government may collect
religious taxes to provide revenue for the official church.83 In certain countries with an established state religion, members of the religious hierarchy
law of religion in a multidenominational political community where the State wants to be the
common ‘home for all citizens.’”). See also Temperman, supra note 25, at 9-14.
79.
For a discussion of belief, ethnicity, nationalism, and religion, see David Little,
Studying “Religious Human Rights”: Methodological Foundations, in RELIGIOUS HUMAN
RIGHTS IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE: LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 61-70 (Johan D. van der Vyver &
John Witte, Jr. eds., 1996). See also Witte, supra note 43, at 707 (noting that some religious
groups “tie religious identity not to voluntary choice, but to birth and caste, blood and soil,
language and ethnicity”).
80.
Countries with an official state religion may enact laws that discriminate against
nonstate religions. Although such “de jure acts of discrimination are not racial, but religious,
in nature . . . to the extent that they affect ethnic groups, they are also racial in nature.”
Reps., Studies, and Other Documentation for the Preparatory Committee and the World
Conference, May 1-5, 2000, ¶ 119 n.128, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.189/PC.1/7 (April 13, 200),
available at http://daccess-ddsny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G00/127/06/PDF/G0012706.pdf?OpenElement. See
Mahmood, supra note 5, at 609 (“Public stereotyping of religious minorities is a leading
source of religious tension everywhere.”).
81.
See Mahmood, supra note 5, at 608 (“Legal assurances of a state’s neutrality in
religious matters and statutory guarantees of equality of all citizens with respect to religious
rights are generally not reflected in reality. Adoption or nonadoption of an officially sponsored religion seems to make no substantial difference in this matter – in almost every instance the majority religion silently attains a privileged position. . . . [I]n the case of religious
minorities, this ‘numerical inferiority’ often turns into social and political inferiority, and the
numerically ‘non-dominant position’ gets translated in to the hegemony of the religious
majority. This results in a denial of civil rights to religious minorities, in open violation of
international human rights instruments and domestic constitutions.”).
82.
See Evans & Thomas, supra note 21, at 713-719. Temperman, supra note 24, at
23-30.
83.
See Christensen, supra note 18, at 590-591. Garde, supra note 17, at 166, 173
(“The so-called church tax—only imposed on the members of the National Church – is
assessed by the municipality. [I]n Denmark there is no direct support to other religious
communities.”).
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hold positions of power within the government, and therefore can influence
governmental policies and state laws to an extent that religious leaders of
other faiths cannot.84 Where the country’s constitution contains a provision
proclaiming the establishment of the state religion, and public office holders are required to take an oath that they will uphold and defend the constitution, this may place religious minorities who are elected or appointed to
public office in an untenable position.85
While nondiscrimination with respect to governmental restrictions upon religious freedom is important and necessary, it is not sufficient to ensure fully the right to nondiscrimination, which must also apply to the government’s conferral of benefits.86 A government could establish privileges
for an official state religion and not infringe directly upon the right of nonadherents freely to practice their own religion (thus no discrimination concerning religious freedom).87 However, privileges that are granted only to
adherents unquestionably discriminate against non-adherents, in violation
of the right to nondiscrimination on the basis of religion. The principle of
nondiscrimination should be applied both to government restrictions on
religious freedom and to preferential governmental treatment favoring one
religion over others.
Members of a state religion may approve of the state’s reinforcement
of their religious beliefs, including public displays of their own religion’s
symbols, state supported religious instruction of their children, and public
financing of their religious organization.88 Some adherents of the majority
religion may feel slighted if the government does not publicly acknowledge
their religion, and they may believe that their religious rights would be violated by disestablishment.89 Indeed, the antidisestablishmentarianism90
84.
See John T.S. Madeley, European Liberal Democracy and the Principle of State
Religious Neutrality, 2626 W. EUR. POL. 1-22 (2003) (describing the strong influence of the
Anglican Church in the United Kingdom, including the twenty-six bishops who are members
of the House of Lords).
85.
As a similar example, the European Court of Human Rights held that a San
Marino law requiring parliamentarians to take an oath on a religious text violated their freedom of religion. Evans & Thomas, supra note 20, at 708 (citing Buscarini v. San Marino,
Eur. Ct. H. R. 34-41 (1999)).
86.
See Temperman, supra note 25, at 9-14.
87.
See Evans & Thomas, supra note 21, at 713-719.
88.
Id.
89.
Temperman, supra note 25, at 22 (“Establishmentarians may counter that the
alienation argument cuts both ways: does a state with an overwhelming majority adhering to
one and the same church not risk alienating those people by not elevating this church to the
level of a state church?” ).
90.
Antidisestablishmentarianism, which is considered to be the longest word in the
English language, describes the opposition to the separation of church and state with respect
to an established religion. See Madeley, A Framework for the Comparative Analysis of
Church-State Relations in Europe, supra note 5, at 17.
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movement has become fairly strong in certain countries. However, the fact
that one group of people has enjoyed the benefits that their privileged and
dominant position has enabled them to achieve at the expense of minorities
does not mean that such discrimination should continue to persist and does
not take away from the fact that such privileges constitute violations of the
country’s international human rights commitments and international human
rights norms.91

2.

The Right to Freedom of Religious Practice and Belief

International human rights instruments ensure the right to freedom of
religious practice and belief. The free exercise of religion was the first religious right to be recognized by the international community in the Treaty of
Peace of Westphalia signed in 1648.92 The UDHR indicates that
“[e]veryone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion;
this right includes . . . freedom, either alone or in community with others
and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance.”93 ICCPR echoes this right,94 as does the
Declaration on Religion.95 Furthermore, the Declaration specifies:
In accordance with article 1 of the present Declaration, and subject to the provisions of article 1, paragraph 3, the right to freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief shall include, inter alia,
the following freedoms:

91.
Temperman, supra note 25, at 22 (“[I]n a democratic society with respect for
pluralism majorities cannot always get what they want.”).
92.
See Machado, supra note 4, at 454 (“In Article XXVIII of the Treaty of Peace
of Westphalia, we find, for the first time, some recognition of ‘free Exercise of religion’ in
an international treaty concerned with the preservation of international peace and security.”).
93.
UDHR, supra note 31, art. 18.
94.
See ICCPR, supra note 32, art. 18 (“1. Everyone shall have the right to freedom
of thought, conscience and religion. This right shall include freedom to have or to adopt a
religion or belief of his choice, and freedom, either individually or in community with others
and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in worship, observance, practice
and teaching. 2. No one shall be subject to coercion which would impair his freedom to have
or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice.”).
95.
See Declaration, supra note 30, art. 1 (“Everyone shall have the right to freedom
of thought, conscience and religion. This right shall include freedom to have a religion or
whatever belief of his choice, and freedom, either individually or in community with others
and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in worship, observance, practice
and teaching. 2. No one shall be subject to coercion which would impair his freedom to have
a religion or belief of his choice.”).
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a) To worship or assemble in connection with a
religion or belief, and to establish and maintain
places for these purposes;
b) To establish and maintain appropriate charitable or humanitarian institutions;
c) To make, acquire and use to an adequate extent the necessary articles and materials related
to the rites or customs of a religion or belief;
d) To write, issue and disseminate relevant publications in these areas;
e) To teach a religion or belief in places suitable
for these purposes;
f) To solicit and receive voluntary financial and
other contributions from individuals and institutions;
g) To train, appoint, elect or designate by succession appropriate leaders called for by the requirements and standards of any religion or belief;
h) To observe days of rest and to celebrate holidays and ceremonies in accordance with the
precepts of one's religion or belief;
i) To establish and maintain communications
with individuals and communities in matters of
religion and belief at the national and international levels.96
Regional human rights instruments also ensure the right to freedom of
religious practice and belief. The European Convention provides that “everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this
right includes . . . freedom, either alone or in community with others and in
public or private, to manifest his religion or belief, in worship, teaching,
practice and observance.”97 The Inter-American Declaration provides that
“[e]very person has the right freely to profess a religious faith, and to manifest
96.
97.

Declaration, supra note 30, art. 6.
See European Convention, supra note 36, art. 9.
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and practice it both in public and in private,”98 and that “[e]very person has the
right to associate with others to promote, exercise and protect his legitimate
interests of a . . . religious . . . nature.”99 The Inter-American Convention
states that “[e]veryone has the right to freedom of conscience and of religion. This right includes freedom to maintain or to change one’s religion or
beliefs, and freedom to profess or disseminate one's religion or beliefs, either individually or together with others, in public or in private.”100 It also
guarantees that “[e]veryone has the right to associate freely for . . . religious
. . . purposes.”101 The African Charter guarantees “freedom of conscience
[and] the profession and free practice of religion.”102
In addition to possible infringements upon the religious rights of minority groups, might having an official state religion also violate the religious rights of people adhering to the state religion, as well as the rights of
the religious entity professing the state religion?103 With respect to the state
religion, the government may have the authority to appoint or dismiss religious leaders,104 pay the salaries of the clergy, and own church property.105
The government may also regulate the church106 and control the adoption
and amendment of church laws.107 Furthermore, the government may legal-

98.
American Declaration, supra note 38, art. 3.
99.
Id. art. 22.
100.
American Convention, supra note 37, art. 12(1).
101.
Id. art. 16(1).
102.
African Charter, supra note 39, art. 8.
103.
The right to freedom of religion supports the protection of religious institutions
(as well as individuals) from undue governmental intrusion. Javier Martínez-Torrón, Limitations on Religious Freedom in the Case Law of the European Court of Human Rights, 19
EMORY INT’L L. REV. 587, 609-18 (2005).
104.
Machado, supra note 4, at 530 (discussing the selection of clergy by government officials, the author notes “[t]hese systems either implicitly require that the head of
State belong to the official church, in violation of the principles of freedom of religion and
equal citizenship, or they give the head of State the power to appoint religious leaders based
on purely political reasons”). Garde, supra note 17, at 154 (“[A]lthough the appointment of
clergymen and bishops is to a certain extent bound, the right of dismissal is solidly vested in
the government.”).
105.
Garde, supra note 17, at 153 (“[T]he church as such has no individual property,
legally distinct from the property of the Crown.”).
106.
Id. at 154 (“Acts of Parliaments—or possibly, where no such acts apply, Royal
ordinances or Ministerial orders—regulate the church.”).
107.
Welcome to the Evangelical Lutheran Church of Finland, EVANGELICAL
LUTHERAN CHURCH OF FINLAND, http://evl.fi/EVLen.nsf (last visited July 30, 2013). See also
Christensen, supra note 18, at 591 (“The Synod proposes new church laws and amendments
to existing laws. These proposals must be approved by the Finnish Parliament to be legally
binding.”); Id. at 601 n.47 (“For example, in 1986, an amendment to the Ecclesiastical Act
that would allow women to be ordained to the Lutheran priesthood in Finland was proposed.
Two years after its proposal, Parliament gave its assent and the Act was amended.”).
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ly have the authority to control the religious doctrine of the state church.108
In certain countries with state religions, the courts, parliamentary ombudsmen, attorney generals, and government departments have become involved
in internal matters within the church.109 Thus, the government may exercise
a degree of control over the internal operations of the religious institution
that violates human rights norms.110 When the state steps in to resolve doctrinal disputes within the officially established religion, it is privileging the
religious views of some members over others, thus violating the right to
freedom of religious practice and belief of the minority adherents.111 Coopting the coercive authority of the state to mandate that adherents to the
state religion believe certain state-approved religious tenets and reject others that are not approved by the state is anathema to the free exercise of
religion.112
Of course, states can and do legitimately exercise a certain amount of
control over religious institutions and religious practices, but such control is
limited. As indicated in the international human rights instruments, the state
may restrict the right to manifest religion, but generally only where the restrictions are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society to
108.
Garde, supra note 17, at 155 (“[T]he organs of the state, both the legislature and
the executive, have and use the right to make decisions binding the National Church . . .
[a]nd the translations of the Bible to be used in church . . . have for centuries been authorized
by Royal order. A concept often heard–once more, more from theologians than from lawyers–is “the internal affairs of the Church” meaning that there is a hard core where Parliament and Ministry of Ecclesiastical Affairs should never meddle, rather have no right to
meddle. On the other hand, all legal theory is agreed that legally speaking there are no
bounds . . . in decisive moments the secular Parliament has regulated clearly internal matters
of the church.”).
109.
E.g., id. at 157-165.
110.
“[Roger] Williams insisted on a sharp line between church and state; indeed, he
sought a ‘wall of separation between the garden of the church and the wilderness of this
world.’ The wall was intended to protect the true church from the corruption of the outside
world [i.e., the state].” NOONAN, THE BELIEVER AND THE POWERS THAT ARE: CASES,
HISTORY, AND OTHER DATA BEARING ON THE RELATION OF RELIGION AND GOVERNMENT 65
(Macmillan Publg. Co. 1987), quoted in Reid, supra note 72, at 396-97.
111.
See Bernadette A. Meyler, The Limits of Group Rights: Religious Institutions
and Religious Minorities in International Law, 22 ST. JOHN’S J. OF LEGAL COMMENT. 535,
537 (2007) (“[O]ne of the obstacles to international human rights bodies’ protection of religious freedom is . . . a willingness to tolerate an excessively unitary conception of the religious institution.”). One such difficulty arises when states “choose to legitimate one particular version of a religion over others.” Id.
112.
Machado, supra note 4, at 458 (“The originality of John Locke’s contribution
has to do with his persistent theoretical defense of freedom of conscience and religion as a
basis from which natural rights, popular sovereignty, limitations on political power and
separation of church and state are derived. Locke’s main arguments for individual freedom
are based mostly on the notion that true faith has to be sincere, rather than coerced, and that
coercion in matters of religion is inconsistent with the doctrine and practice of Christian
love.”).
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protect public safety, public order, health, or morals, or to protect the fundamental rights and freedoms of others.113 Moreover, the state must remain
neutral and impartial concerning religious disputes between opposing sides
within a religious tradition and cannot determine that one side’s beliefs are
legitimate while the other side’s beliefs are not or require that the two sides
be merged under a unified leadership.114 Presumably, setting the level of
clergy salaries, establishing the terms of their employment (including hiring
and firing), overseeing the maintenance of church property, determining a
large portion of the institution’s budget, and so on, would not, in general,
implicate matters of protecting public safety, health, morals, or the rights
and freedoms of others. However, state involvement in such matters could
lead to substantial interference with the internal operations of the religious
entity (including internal theological debates), thus calling into question
whether these practices may violate the religious freedom of the entity and
individuals adhering to the official state religion.

3.

The Rights of Parents and Children Regarding Religious Upbringing

Various international human rights instruments ensure the right to
freedom of religious practice and belief particularly with respect to parents
and children. The UDHR indicates that education shall “promote understanding, tolerance and friendship among all . . . religious groups” and that
“[p]arents have a prior right to choose the kind of education that shall be
given to their children.”115 ICCPR provides that “[t]he States Parties to the
present Covenant undertake to have respect for the liberty of parents and,
when applicable, legal guardians to ensure the religious and moral education of their children in conformity with their own convictions.”116 ICESCR
113.
European Convention, supra note 36, art. 9(2); ICCPR, supra note 32, art.
18(2). The European Court of Human Rights has considered the following three elements in
approaching cases alleging violations of the right to freedom of religious practice: 1) whether the restriction has actually infringed upon the petitioner’s practice of his or her religion, 2)
if so, whether the restriction is justified by protection of public safety, health, morals, or the
rights and freedoms of others, and 3) whether the restriction is necessary in a democratic
society. See Refah Partisi v. Turkey, App. Nos. 44774/98, 41342/98, 41343/98, 41344/98,
Eur. Ct. H.R. (2003), available at
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-60936#{"itemid":["00160936"]}; Leyla Sahin v. Turkey, App. No. 44774/98, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2005), available at
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-70956#{"itemid":["00170956"]}. See also Martínez-Torrón, supra note 102, at 593.
114.
Martínez-Torrón, supra note 103, at 613-618 (discussing Serif v. Greece (1999)
and Hasan & Chaush v. Bulgaria (2000))
115.
UDHR, supra note 31, art. 26(2-3).
116.
ICCPR, supra note 32, art. 18(4).
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also provides that states that are parties to the treaty “agree that education
shall . . . promote understanding, tolerance and friendship among all nations
and all racial, ethnic or religious groups.”117 Moreover, “the States Parties
to the present Covenant undertake to have respect for the liberty of parents
and, when applicable, legal guardians to . . . ensure the religious and moral
education of their children in conformity with their own convictions.”118
The Declaration on Religion indicates that:
1. The parents or, as the case may be, the legal
guardians of the child have the right to organize the
life within the family in accordance with their religion or belief and bearing in mind the moral education in which they believe the child should be
brought up.
2. Every child shall enjoy the right to have access
to education in the matter of religion or belief in
accordance with the wishes of his parents or, as the
case may be, legal guardians, and shall not be
compelled to receive teaching on religion or belief
against the wishes of his parents or legal guardians,
the best interests of the child being the guiding
principle.
3. The child shall be protected from any form of
discrimination on the ground of religion or belief.
He shall be brought up in a spirit of understanding,
tolerance, friendship among peoples, peace and
universal brotherhood, respect for freedom of religion or belief of others, and in full consciousness
that his energy and talents should be devoted to the
service of his fellow men.
4. In the case of a child who is not under the care
either of his parents or of legal guardians, due account shall be taken of their expressed wishes or of
any other proof of their wishes in the matter of religion or belief, the best interests of the child being
the guiding principle.

117.
118.

ICESCR, supra note 33, art. 13(1).
Id. art. 13(3).
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5. Practices of a religion or belief in which a child
is brought up must not be injurious to his physical
or mental health or to his full development, taking
into account article 1, paragraph 3, of the present
Declaration.119
Regional human rights instruments also ensure the right to freedom of
religious practice and belief regarding parents and children. The European
Convention provides that “[i]n the exercise of any functions which it assumes in relation to education and to teaching, the State shall respect the
right of parents to ensure such education and teaching in conformity with
their own religious and philosophical convictions.”120 The Inter-American
Convention guarantees that “[p]arents or guardians, as the case may be,
have the right to provide for the religious and moral education of their children or wards that is in accord with their own convictions.”121
These instruments specifically guarantee the right of parents to direct
the religious upbringing of their children.122 States must respect the right of
a parent to provide direction to children in exercising their religious rights
consistent with their evolving capacities.123 Moreover, children are also
afforded the right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion.124 As
they become capable of forming their own opinions, children have the right
to express their views freely in all matters affecting themselves, and their
views are to be given due weight in accordance with their age and maturity.125 Furthermore, states must respect children’s rights without discrimination based on their own or their parents’ religion126 and must take measures
119.
Declaration, supra note 30, art. 5.
120.
See Protocol to the (European) Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms, art. 2, 213 U.N.T.S. 262 (entered into force May 18, 1954).
121.
American Convention, supra note 37, art. 12(4).
122.
ICCPR, supra note 32, art. 18(4) (“The States Parties to the present Covenant
undertake to have respect for the liberty of parents and, when applicable, legal guardians to
ensure the religious and moral education of their children in conformity with their own convictions.”). See also European Convention, supra note 36, protocol I, art. 2 (“No person shall
be denied the right to education. In the exercise of any functions which it assumes in relation
to education and to teaching, the State shall respect the right of parents to ensure such education and teaching in conformity with their own religious and philosophical convictions.”).
The UDHR guarantees that parents may choose the type of education to provide to their
children. UDHR, supra note 31, art. 26(3).
123.
CRC, supra note 34, art. 14(2). Although tensions may arise between the rights
of parents and the rights of children regarding religious upbringing, those issues are outside
the scope of this Article. However, they are crucially important and will be fascinating issues
to address in a future article.
124.
Id. art. 14(1).
125.
Id. art. 12(1).
126.
Id. art. 2(1). See also ICESCR, supra note 33, art. 2(2) (discussing protection
against discrimination based on religion, social origin, birth, or other factors).
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to prevent all forms of discrimination or punishment on the basis of the
status, activities, expressed opinions or beliefs of the child’s parents, legal
guardians, or family members.127
On the other hand, these rights may be limited as prescribed by law
and to the extent that the limitations are necessary to protect public safety,
order, health, or morals, or that they are necessary to protect the fundamental rights and freedoms of others.128 In all circumstances regarding children,
the best interests of the child are considered to be paramount.129 Additionally, under the Convention on the Rights of the Child, states agree to ensure
that education of children will prepare them “for responsible life in a free
society, in the spirit of understanding, peace, tolerance, equality of the sexes, and friendship among all peoples, ethnic, national and religious groups
and persons of indigenous origin”130 and that such education will enable
children to develop respect for their own cultural identity and values, for
the national values of the country in which the children are living, for the
country from which the children may have originated, and for civilizations
different from their own.131 Under jurisprudence applying the European
Convention, the state has been allowed to restrict public manifestation of
religion in schools in order to protect the rights and freedoms of others,
including the right of parents to determine their children’s religious upbringing and in the interests of preserving public order and safety.132
As mentioned above, in nations with a state religion, the government
may attempt to strengthen the official religion by providing religious education to children through the public school system.133 However, by doing so,
127.
CRC, supra note 34, art. 2(2). See also ICESCR, supra note 33, art. 10(3) (discussing protecting against discrimination based on parentage or other conditions).
128.
CRC, supra note 34, art. 14(3).
129.
Id. art. 3(1).
130.
Id. art. 29(1)(d).
131.
Id. art. 29(1)(c).
132.
X. v. United Kingdom, App. No. 8010/77, 16 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep.
101; Dahlab v. Switzerland, App. No. 42393/98, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2001); Leyla Sahin v. Turkey, App. No. 44774/98, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2005), discussed in Martínez-Torrón, supra note
102, at 620-624.
133.
The possible purposes for such religious instruction in public schools may include salvation; education of the next generation in the culture, history, tradition of the country; and promotion of respect and tolerance for other religions. See generally Christensen,
supra note 18, at 595 (footnotes omitted) (“[S]tate church religious instruction in Finland is
statutorily included in the high school curriculum. High school religion courses are taught by
Lutheran instructors and are based on the Church's beliefs and history. Other religions are
studied from a historical standpoint, and representatives from non-Lutheran churches may be
invited to present their beliefs to a religion class.”). See Blitt, supra note 18, at 760-68 (discussing the Russian Orthodox Church’s pressure on the national government to adopt a
religious education course in public schools). Article 53(4) of the Polish Constitution provides that “[t]he religion of a church or other legally recognized religious organization may
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this governmental action may raise concerns about the rights of parents to
direct the religious upbringing of their children, as well as the religious
rights of the children themselves.134 This is true of families who adhere to
minority religions, as well as families who adhere to the majority religion
but not in the same way as it is being taught or interpreted by the state. The
government may also attempt to restrict the rights of parents and their children to leave the state church.135
How should the international human rights community approach a situation where the state may hold one view concerning the best interests of
the child, such as its opinion of what may bring about the child’s religious
salvation, and the parents may hold another view, such as a different manner of bringing about the child’s religious salvation or a belief that religious
salvation does not exist and therefore no such action should be taken?136
What role should the state play in religious instruction of children, if any?
As noted above, perhaps if a nation existed in which all of its inhabitants
practiced exactly the same religion, with exactly the same beliefs, in exactly
the same way, then state instruction of religion in public schools may not be
problematic. However, if any individuals held any religious beliefs that
be taught in schools.” Ryszard Cholewinski, The Protection of Human Rights in the New
Polish Constitution, 22 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 236, 265 (1998).
134.
CRC, supra note 34, art. 2, 14.
135.
Elizabeth Christensen explains:
The right of religious freedom is endowed on a person at the
age of eighteen, the Finnish age of majority since 1968. Until
that age, minors automatically belong to their parents' church.
When parents or guardians of minors renounce a church or
join another religion, their children who are fifteen years old
or older do not separate with them unless the children consent.
Such consent must be given to their parish priest, or to their
church's governing board if they belong to a church other than
either of the state churches. Conversely, children under fifteen
years of age accompany their parents in matters of religious affiliation, and are not permitted to leave that church even with
parental consent until the age of fifteen. These laws favor the
Church, to which 88.6 percent of the Finnish population belongs, because they require the youth of Finland to remain affiliated with their parents' religion until they reach the age of
majority, or with the religion of their childhood, even if their
parents separate, unless the child is over fifteen years old. By
age fifteen, most church members have attended confirmation
and, in so doing, have committed to lifetime membership and
support of the Church.
See Christensen, supra note 18, at 593 (footnotes omitted).
136.
Interestingly, at least one legal scholar in this field seemed to suggest that certain actions “might be shown empirically to be the best for the child’s . . . religious salvation.” See Johan D. van der Vyver, Limitations of Freedom of Religion or Belief: International Law Perspectives, 19 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 449, 517 (2005).
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were inconsistent with that espoused by the state, then such religious instruction by the state will pose concerns. This would be true whether such
individuals held different interpretations of the state religion, or whether
such individuals adhered to an entirely different religion. This Article suggests that no country in the world contains an entirely homogenous population regarding religious beliefs137 and, therefore, that the state should refrain
from religious instruction in public schools.138 Moreover, the mere fact that
the state proclaims one religion to be official could have an especially deleterious effect upon children who are not of that religious faith, as children
may be more vulnerable to psychological effects of not “fitting in” than
adults.

4.

The Right to Change One’s Religious Affiliation and Beliefs

International human rights instruments ensure the right to change
one’s religious affiliation and beliefs. The UDHR indicates that “the right to
freedom of thought, conscience and religion . . . includes freedom to change
his religion or belief.”139 ICCPR ensures that everyone has the “freedom . . .
to adopt a religion or belief of his choice” and that “[n]o one shall be subject to coercion which would impair his freedom . . . to adopt a religion or
belief of his choice.”140 Regional human rights instruments also ensure the
right to change one’s religious affiliation and belief. The European Convention provides that the right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion
“includes freedom to change his religion or belief.”141 The Inter-American
Convention indicates that the right to freedom of conscience and religion
“includes freedom to . . . change one’s religion or beliefs” and that “[n]o
one shall be subject to restrictions that might impair his freedom to . . .
change his religion or beliefs.”142
137.
“Homogeneity is rare, if not non-existent, in the world today.” M. Walzer, The
Politics of Difference: Statehood and Toleration in a Multicultural World, in THE MORALITY
OF NATIONALISM 249 (R. McKim & J. McMahan eds., 1997), quoted in Madeley, A Framework for the Comparative Analysis of Church-State Relations in Europe, supra note 5, at 50
n.36.
138.
This Article focuses on state involvement in religious instruction in public
schools. It does not address the situation where the public school curriculum involves teaching about religion, as opposed to instructing students in a particular religion. For an article
addressing the government’s involvement in teaching about religion in public schools in the
United States, see Jay D. Wexler, Preparing for the Clothed Public Square: Teaching about
Religion, Civic Education, and the Constitution, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1159, 1161
(2002).
139.
UDHR, supra note 31, art. 18.
140.
ICCPR, supra note 32, art. 18 (1), (2).
141.
See European Convention, supra note 36, art. 9.
142.
American Convention, supra note 37, art. 12 (1), (2).
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Some states with an established religion may restrict certain governmental offices to adherents of the state religion. Arguably the restriction of
such positions to members of the state religion violates the right to freedom
of religion. Presumably, if such office holders want to convert to another
religion, they must abdicate their positions, and this requirement constitutes
a severe penalty and considerable restriction upon the right to change one’s
religious affiliation and beliefs.
C.

OTHER HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATED BY STATE RELIGIONS

The above examples of encroachments upon well-established rights
pertaining to religion bolster the argument that church and state separation
is necessary to ensure their fulfillment, and strengthen the position favoring
disestablishment. Of course, one could think of other human rights that are
not specifically religious rights but that are also violated by the state’s establishment of an official national religion. State preference for one religion
could arguably infringe upon the right to human dignity. The right to freedom of marriage may be violated. Additionally, at times more severe human rights violations also exist. This section briefly explores some of these
issues, although many others could be addressed.

1.

The Right to Dignity

International human rights instruments ensure the right to human dignity.143 The UDHR indicates that “[a]ll human beings are born free and
equal in dignity and rights”144 and that “[e]veryone, as a member of society
. . . is entitled to realization . . . of the economic, social and cultural rights
indispensable for his dignity and the free development of his personality.”145 The Declaration on Religion indicates that:
Discrimination between human beings on the
grounds of religion or belief constitutes an affront
to human dignity and a disavowal of the principles
of the Charter of the United Nations, and shall be
condemned as a violation of the human rights and
fundamental freedoms proclaimed in the Universal
143.
For an in-depth exploration of human dignity as a human right, see ERIN DALY,
DIGNITY RIGHTS: COURTS, CONSTITUTIONS, AND THE WORTH OF THE HUMAN PERSON (2013);
YECHIEL MICHAEL BARILAN, HUMAN DIGNITY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND RESPONSIBILITY: THE
NEW LANGUAGE OF GLOBAL BIOETHICS AND BIOLAW (2012); and MICHAEL ROSEN, DIGNITY:
ITS HISTORY AND MEANING (2012).
144.
UDHR, supra note 31, art. 1.
145.
Id. art. 22.
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Declaration of Human Rights and enunciated in detail in the International Covenants on Human
Rights, and as an obstacle to friendly and peaceful
relations between nations.146
Regional human rights instruments ensure the right to human dignity,
such as the Inter-American Convention147 and the African Charter.148
By establishing an official state religion, the government signals that
the religious beliefs and practices of non-adherents149 are less valid and less
true than those of people who adhere to the state religion. The government’s designation of an official state religion may have a demoralizing and
stigmatizing effect on the psyche and emotional well being of nonadherents, raising the specter of historical discrimination.150 It may make

146.
Declaration, supra note 30, art. 3.
147.
American Convention, supra note 37, art. 11(1) (“Everyone has the right to
have his honor respected and his dignity recognized.”).
148.
African Charter, supra note 39, art. 5 (“Every individual shall have the right to
the respect of the dignity inherent in a human being.”).
149.
The right to freedom of religious thought, conscience, and belief includes agnosticism and atheism. See U.N. Human Rights Committee, CCPR General Comment No.
22: Article 18 (Freedom of Thought, Conscience or Religion), ¶ 2, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.4 (July 30, 1993),
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.4. (“Article
18 protects theistic, non-theistic and atheistic beliefs, as well as the right not to profess any
religion or belief.”). See also Perry, supra note 20, at 397 n. 26 (citing KAREN MUSALO,
UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, CLAIMS FOR PROTECTION BASED ON
RELIGION OR BELIEF: ANALYSIS AND PROPOSED CONCLUSIONS (2002)) (“Although the ICCPR
does not itself define “religion or belief” there is extensive guidance in the travaux, as well
as from the bodies monitoring ICCPR’s implementation . . . . [I]t is clear that Article 18 of
the ICCPR protects both religious and nonreligious forms of belief. Thus it protects the right
to hold a belief as well as the right to refrain from adopting any religion or belief. Comprehended within this right is the right to choose, change or retain the religion or belief of one’s
choice.”). Protections of the rights of agnostics and atheists as holders of minority religious
beliefs is growing increasingly important as this segment of the world population continues
to grow. See Daniel M. Abrams, Haley A. Yaple & Richard J. Wiener, A Mathematical
Model of Social Group Competition with Application to the Growth of Religious NonAffiliation, 107 PHYSICAL REV. LETTERS 088701 (2011), available at
http://arxiv.org/pdf/1012.1375v2.pdf (“People claiming no religious affiliation constitute the
fastest growing religious minority in many countries throughout the world.”).
150.
Madeley, A Framework for the Comparative Analysis of Church-State Relations
in Europe, supra note 5, at 36-37 (discussing the history of state religions in Europe, this
article notes, “Orthodoxy, Catholicism and Lutheranism . . . had a common prejudice in
favour of ‘comprehension’, the principle that all members of society should be included. The
corollary of this prejudice was that those who for whatever reason resisted inclusion in the
church and submission to its demands were typically excluded from society and subjected to
numerous indignities and punishments.” It also notes that “[w]here historic uniformity of
religion could only be achieved and maintained by actual use of coercive means, there often
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them feel ostracized and less welcome in that country and may indicate that
they are considered to be second-class citizens (or residents) by virtue of
their lack of faith in the official, government-sanctioned religion.151 As noted above, it may also contribute to an atmosphere fostering discriminatory
sentiments and actions by people adhering to the state religion against people who hold minority religious beliefs.152 By contrast, the separation of
religion and state preserves the dignity of inhabitants of the state who hold
minority beliefs.153

2.

The Right to Marry

International human rights instruments ensure certain rights with respect to marriage. The UDHR indicates that “[m]en and women of full age,
without any limitation due to race, nationality or religion, have the right to
marry and to found a family.”154 ICCPR provides that “[t]he right of men
and women of marriageable age to marry and to found a family shall be
recognized.”155 ICESCR also states that “[t]he widest possible protection
remained a heritage of resentment”). It is out of these historical traditions that the state
churches of today have arisen, and through which their current context must be understood.
151.
W. Cole Durham, Jr., Perspectives on Religious Liberty: A Comparative
Framework, in RELIGIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE: LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 24
(Johan D. van der Vyver & John Witte, Jr. eds., 1996) (“[T]here is always a sense in such
regimes that smaller religious communities have a kind of second-class status.”). See also
Garde, supra note 17, at 153 (“Islam has the same rights – and every single [Muslim] the
same liberty of religion – as everybody else. At the same time, it is understandable that some
[Muslims] consider themselves as socially or at any rate symbolically disadvantaged by not
having what could be considered an official stamp of respectability, as pointed out to the
Minister of Ecclesiastical Affairs (also Minister for the Interior) by a majority of the Council
for Ethnical Minorities . . . recently.”). Although this instance was in response to their inability to gain official recognition as other minority religious groups had done, the same sentiments could arise with respect to the government’s establishment of an official state religion.
152.
Madeley, A Framework for the Comparative Analysis of Church-State Relations
in Europe, supra note 5, at 39 (“Mono-confessional societies might be expected to be less
tolerant than multi-confessional societies, where pluralism and difference has for long been
part of common experience, and civility is held to require mutual non-interference, if not
respect.”). For example, consider the gunman in Norway who killed eighty Norwegians
affiliated with the government and the ruling party to protest the country’s immigration
policies that he considered not to be sufficiently restrictive, particularly with respect to Muslim immigrants. See Editorial, Norway’s Tragedy, WASHINGTON POST, July 25, 2011,
http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2011-07-25/opinions/35236631_1_anti-muslim-norwaymassacre-muslim-extremists; Elisa Mala & J. David Goodman, At Least 80 Dead in Norway
Shooting, NEW YORK TIMES, July 22, 2011,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/23/world/europe/23oslo.html?pagewanted=all.
153.
Machado, supra note 4, at 527 (noting that separation preserves equal dignity of
minority religious communities).
154.
UDHR, supra note 31, art. 16(1).
155.
ICCPR, supra note 32, art. 23.
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and assistance should be accorded to the family, which is the natural and
fundamental group unit of society, particularly for its establishment.”156
Regional human rights instruments also ensure the right to marry. The
European Convention provides that “[m]en and women of marriageable age
have the right to marry and to found a family, according to the national
laws governing the exercise of this right.”157 More broadly, the InterAmerican Declaration states that “[e]very person has the right to establish a
family, the basic element of society, and to receive protection therefore.”158
The Inter-American Convention provides that “[t]he right of men and women of marriageable age to marry and to raise a family shall be recognized, if
they meet the conditions required by domestic laws, insofar as such conditions do not affect the principle of nondiscrimination established in this
Convention.”159
Some countries with state churches require the monarch to be a member of the state church.160 Therefore, states with a hereditary monarchy may
restrict the monarch’s freedom to marry a spouse who is not a member of
the state religion, since that might mean that the children who would be
next in line of succession to the throne may not be members of the state
religion, and, therefore, the monarch could not pass the crown to heirs, infringing not only upon religious freedom but also upon other rights concerning marriage and family.

3.

Additional Examples

Of course, one could think of more egregious violations of human
rights in states that have established religions, as well. Some states that
have adopted Islam as the official state religion have required the amputation of limbs as punishment for the crime of theft and imposed stoning to
death as punishment for the crime of adultery. In discriminating against
those holding minority faiths, some Islamic states have resorted to rape,
flogging, electric shock, burning, amputations, suspension by the wrists or
ankles, forced conversion, forced marriage, murder, and other forms of violence, torture, and harassment.161 These and other government enforced
religious mandates violate numerous human rights principles, such as the
right to freedom from inhumane, cruel or unusual punishment; the right to
156.
ICESCR, supra note 33, art. 10(1).
157.
European Convention, supra note 36, art. 12.
158.
American Declaration, supra note 38, art. VI.
159.
American Convention, supra note 37, art. 17(2).
160.
“The King (today, the Queen regent) must belong to the Evangelic-Lutheran
church.” DANISH CONSTITUTION OF 1953 art. 6, quoted in Garde, supra note 17, at 153.
161.
Nathan A. Adams, IV, A Human Rights Imperative: Extending Religious Liberty
Beyond the Border, 33 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 1, 20-22 (2000).
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health; the right to bodily integrity; the right to life; and the right to nondiscrimination on the basis of sex.
D.

LEGITIMACY OF THE INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
SYSTEM

Despite the international community’s current lack of recognition of
antiestablishmentarianism as necessary for the protection of religious rights,
which is addressed further in Part IV, the above examination of several
components within the settled international human rights framework supports a more explicit call by the international community for church and
state separation. As demonstrated above, the establishment of an official
state religion gives rise to numerous human rights violations. Of course,
establishment may only give rise to violations of some, but not all, of the
human rights provided as examples in this section. On the other hand, nations with a state religion may violate other human rights that have not been
addressed here. Furthermore, countries that do not have an official state
religion may also violate the human rights discussed in this section. This
Article does not attempt to resolve all of these issues. The central point is
that nations with an official state religion invariably violate at least some
internationally protected human rights, and therefore, disestablishment is
necessary in order to ensure compliance with international human rights
norms.162
State religions are prevalent in countries that are widely seen as leaders in upholding human rights principles, such as Denmark, Iceland, and the
United Kingdom.163 One might ask whether the separation of church and
state is really necessary in progressive, democratic countries that have good
track records on human rights in general. Yet even in such progressive
countries that are normally regarded as leaders in upholding human rights,
the establishment of religion is problematic. These theocratic remnants164
within such countries are troubling, especially since the global community
is currently grappling with extreme violations of religious rights perpetrated
by governments with state religions in other parts of the world. Violations
of religious rights are readily condemned in theocratic regimes where reli-

162.
Machado, supra note 4, at 510 (“Separation prevents the State from using its
powers to coerce, persecute and discriminate in the name of religion.”).
163.
Id. at 515 (“[A] significant number of European countries maintained, and some
still maintain, a de jure or de facto established church . . . . This is still the case in countries
such as England, Germany, Holland, Norway, Finland, Italy, Greece, Spain, and Portugal.”).
164.
Id. at 510 (“[N]umerous examples of institutional union between Church and
State in Europe remain, holdovers from deep-rooted traditions of theologico-political unity.”).
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gious intolerance and persecution are well apparent.165 However, states that
are perceived to be more egalitarian, democratic, and relatively respectful
of religious pluralism may not have received quite such rigorous scrutiny.
Denouncing more extreme cases of human rights violations in countries that
are well known for such atrocities is relatively easy. On the other hand, if
one can make the case against the establishment of religion in countries
normally considered to be respectful of human rights, this approach may
help to strengthen the universal applicability of religious rights and, thus,
their acceptability across the globe. The legitimacy of international condemnation of religious discrimination and other violations of religious
rights may be undermined if such violations are not consistently censured,
including with respect to more progressive countries. It is important that
legal scholars concerned with human rights, as well as the international
human rights bodies themselves, raise and examine concerns about state
religions in well-established democracies with good human rights records
as well as in countries with less stellar marks. Therefore, the international
human rights community should adopt the doctrine of antiestablishmentarianism as a fundamental component of religious rights.

III. ADDITIONAL CONCERNS POSED BY THE ESTABLISHMENT OF
RELIGION
In spite of problems posed by the establishment of an official religion
by national governments, antidisestablishmentarianism sentiments within
many countries remain strong. People may embrace officially sanctioned
religions for myriad reasons, such as ensuring the salvation of the inhabitants of the country; fostering increased religiosity of the population; preserving their nation’s history, tradition, and culture; appreciating public
displays of religious symbols; valuing state supported religious instruction
of their children; and welcoming public funding for their religious institutions.166 As a practical matter, leaders of the church hierarchy may benefit
financially from the establishment of religion, such as state payment of their
salaries and contributions to the budget of their religious organizations.
165.
See generally Kenneth Jost, Religious Persecution: Is the Global Persecution of
Christians Increasing?, 7 CQ RESEARCHER 1011 (1997).
166.
See John D. Basil, Konstantin Petrovich Pobedonostsev: An Argument for a
Russian State Church, 64 CHURCH HIST. 44, 57 (1995) (“Pobedonostsev clarified the state's
special obligations owed to the church, including the duty to protect the church from mischief makers, to provide subsidies for the education of priests and school children, and to
make available funds for the construction and maintenance of buildings. If the state in Russia was to reap a beneficial harvest from its close relationship with the church, careful cultivation would be required.”). See Temperman, supra note 25, at 13 for a discussion of reasons that governments may establish religions.
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Similarly, government officials may want to retain their positions of authority over the church.167 This section highlights and responds to arguments in
favor of an established religion and notes the utility of antiestablishmentarianism regarding each point. Although certain segments of the population
may not be persuaded by human rights arguments, they may be persuaded
to favor antiestablishmentarianism for other pragmatic reasons. Therefore,
any concerted campaign to advance this doctrine as an international human
rights principle should also offer other practical rationales for its adoption
to persuade people who are unmoved by its human rights aspects.
Adherents to a religion may favor state establishment of that religion
as the best or only way to provide salvation to the souls of people within the
nation. The state religion may be viewed as an effective method of proselytism and retention of members. However, others argue that the neutrality of
the state is necessary for people to be authentically religious.168 In countries
with an established state religion, people may become cynical about the
church as being influenced by politics, and therefore cynical about religion
as becoming politicized.169 Politicizing religion may take away the sense
that the religion is a personal belief system and may dilute the meaning of
religion for its adherents. A state’s attempts to impose a particular religion
upon its inhabitants could be seen to devalue that religion. Being aligned
with the state may distort the religion and violate the religious freedom of
the state church. Therefore, establishment could have the effect of diminishing the faith and reducing the number of adherents if people view the religion as either being forced upon them by the state or as being essentially an
167.
For an account of a government official in Russia who espoused the benefits of
a strong church-state relationship, see Basil, supra note 166, at 53 (“The tie between the
church and the state, he maintained, must be kept close, because the strong presence of the
church gave the state a necessary moral direction in addition to a bonus in the form of spontaneous support from the majority of the population. Without this direction and support no
state could long survive. The church, of course, also benefitted from this close relationship,
because it received special attention from the state to the detriment of all non-state churches.”).
168.
Abdullahi A. An-Na’im, Complementary, Not Competing, Claims of Law and
Religion: An Islamic Perspective, 39 PEPP. L. REV. 1252 (2013) (“[W]hatever the state enacts and enforces ceases to be religious by the very fact that the state coercively enforces it.
Since religious belief logically requires the possibility of disbelief, religious conviction and
practice must be a matter of choice.”). The state needs to be neutral, but of course inevitably
government policies will be informed by the religion of the people who are engaged in the
government. The state is made up of individuals, and those individuals each have a belief
about religion, whether their beliefs are religious or non-religious.
169.
See Basil, supra note 166, at 57 (“Peter the Great's use of the clergy to carry out
many of the government's reforms in early eighteenth-century Russia, for example, was
being sharply criticized in the early twentieth century as unwarranted interference by the
emperor in religious life.”). See also id. at 58 (“Pobedonostsev finally resigned in 1905 on
the grounds that changes being forced on his office constituted government interference in
church business.”).
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historical remnant, either of which may cause the religion to cease having
meaning for the individual adherent as a deeply held personal belief.170
Religious adherents of any faith may approve of state sanctioned religious elements in the public sphere (even those of another religion), because they believe this will increase the religiosity of the nation overall and
will provide a counterbalance to secularism, agnosticism, and atheism.
Conversely, others have proposed that the existence of a state-sponsored
religion decreases the religiosity of the nation. In countries embracing antiestablishmentarianism, the reduced interference by the state in religious
matters may actually increase the religiosity of the population and allow
religions to flourish, such as in the United States.171 Where there is no established religion, its absence helps to level the playing field in which all
religions have the opportunity to thrive, thus promoting greater religious

170.
Madeley, A Framework for the Comparative Analysis of Church-State Relations
in Europe, supra note 5, at 37 (“Long-established mono-confessionalism also has its own
pathologies, regardless of confession. Insofar as a virtual confessional monopoly in a particular territory has been maintained by positive state support on the one hand and the repression of challenges on the other, established churches might be expected to become less vital
as organisations. They no longer depended for their sustenance on mobilizing support within
society, looking instead to those in authority within the state to provide, pursuant to the
bargain of mutual support between ‘Crown and Altar’ [leading to] the ‘hollowing out’ of the
established churches of much of Europe. Protected from the challenges of competition in an
open religious ‘market’ of the sort which patently exists in the USA, many, if not most, of
Europe’s established churches are seen progressively to have lost the ability to maintain
levels of commitment and loyalty, without which they have tended to go into institutional
decline.”).
171.
Some people may find that the greater religiosity in nations that do not have an
established religion, such as the United States, seems more oppressive to those with agnostic
or atheistic beliefs than the lesser religiosity in countries that have an established religion,
such as in many European countries. Moreover, people (whether atheist, agnostic, or religious) may not like being subject to proselytism by someone who holds differing religious
beliefs, or even by someone who holds their own religious beliefs. Although these sentiments may be valid, they are beyond the scope of this Article. A primary purpose of the
protection of religious rights under the international human rights system is to permit freedom of religion, the result of which may be the flourishing of religious beliefs as well as
atheist or agnostic beliefs. International human rights principles also protect the right to
proselytize, as long as such practices do not violate the rights of others (proselytism falls
under the protection of freedom of speech and expression as well as protection of religious
rights). As a country that has largely embraced antiestablishmentarianism, the U.S. is a paradigm of religious freedom. According to jurisprudence applying the European Convention,
both individuals and entities have the right to proselytize to spread their teachings and encourage others to convert to their beliefs, as long as they do not use violence, abuse, fraud,
brainwashing, coercion, or improper pressure. Kokkinakis v. Greece, 260 Eur. Ct. H.R. (Ser.
A) 3 (1993), discussed in Martínez-Torrón, supra note 102, at 605-609. The law criminalized proselytism and was “aimed at protecting the social status of the Greek Orthodox
Church.” Martínez-Torrón, supra note 102, at 606.
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freedom.172 Religious leaders themselves have argued for separation of
church and state.173
Residents of a country may view the state religion as an important
component of the nation’s history, tradition, and culture, whether or not
they are members of that religion.174 People value culture and history, of
which religion is an integral component.175 If only a small percentage of the
population regularly participates in religious services, yet a larger percentage utilizes the religious services periodically to celebrate major life changes such as birth (baptisms), marriage (wedding ceremonies), and death (funerals), perhaps the religious institution serves as fulfilling more of a cultural tradition than a religious purpose. Culture is constantly changing and
evolving, and, similarly, religion is constantly changing and evolving.176
Therefore, as mentioned in the preceding section, the question arises as to
whether a state should choose one version of religious belief from a particular historical moment and ossify it, even if the state’s action is purportedly
to preserve a country’s culture. Considering the differences of belief that
exist within every religion at any moment in time, the state could not select
a particular strain of religious belief to adopt as official without infringing
upon the religious rights of adherents who do not share that particular version of the religion. Regarding the historical and cultural aspects of religion, perhaps the state could support some artifacts regarding the nation’s
history and culture that have religious elements, such as the preservation of

172.
STEVEN GOLDBERG, BLEACHED FAITH: THE TRAGIC COST WHEN RELIGION IS
FORCED INTO THE PUBLIC SQUARE 128 (Stanford Univ. Press 2008) (“The unique American
blend of free exercise and non-establishment—our insistence on avoiding both intolerant
secularism and suffocating theocracy—should be a source of pride. We all learn in school
that the settlers of this country came so that they could practice their religions freely. It is
worth remembering that people are still coming to America for the same reason. To this
day, Christians from Asia, Jews from Russia, Muslims from India, and many others come to
follow their faith in peace. . . They come to practice meaningful religion in a free society.”).
173.
Madeley, European Liberal Democracy and the Principle of State Religious
Neutrality, supra note 84, at 4 (“[A] number of bishops and other leaders of opinion in the
Anglican church had recently spoken out in favour of disestablishment.”).
174.
Christensen, supra note 18, at 599 (“To the Church, its relationship to the state
is historical in nature; freedom of religion in Finland does not require that the church's ties to
the state be removed.”); Id. at 600 (“A unique history and culture explain Finland's official
posture with the Church, a posture that includes provisions for church-state relations within
both the Constitution and statutory laws. Christianity, and in particular Lutheranism, played
a major role in Finland's history and cultural development.”).
175.
See Sapir, infra note 226, at 625-641 for a discussion of religion and culture.
See also Temperman, supra note 25, at 21.
176.
Garde, supra note 17, at 157 (“That the interpretation of the [religious] books
has changed over the centuries, goes without saying.”).
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historic sites or works of art, if it could do so without coming too close to
favoring the theological precepts of that religion over others.177
The stability of the government and of society has been used as an argument in favor of an established state religion.178 However, the fact that
the existence of a state religion may threaten stability and could lead to
disgruntlement and violence is currently a more imminent concern.179 Concomitantly, the separation of church and state can lead to a neutral political
environment that fosters cooperation and peaceful resolution of differences
between people of diverse faiths.180 According to Mehmet Fevzi Bilgin,
“religion ipso facto cannot define political authority because, when it did, it
undermined social harmony and public order. Therefore, political authority
should be defined by a far-reaching secular conception, distant from religion but also tolerant of religious expressions as long as religion commands
merely in its own domain.”181 As twin goals of the international legal system, peace and security are fostered by the doctrine of antiestablishmentarianism.182
As a practical matter, when examining state religions, one must take
into account who is benefiting from the close church-state relationship. For
177.
Machado, supra note 4, at 520 (stating that separation “should also be compatible with the public acknowledgement of the important historical role religious bodies, doctrines and symbols have played in making our present political and legal institutions”)
“Some public acknowledgement of [religious] traditions, desirable as illustrative of the
history and identity of communities . . . is perfectly compatible with the voluntary nature of
religion generally, and with the substantive value of equal citizenship.” Id. at 523.
178.
Madeley, A Framework for the Comparative Analysis of Church-State Relations
in Europe, supra note 5, at 46 (“[R]eligious uniformity and conformity was also without
doubt seen as providing a valuable extra support of internal order and stability.”).
179.
Madeley, European Liberal Democracy and the Principle of State Religious
Neutrality, supra note 84, at 18 (“[P]articularly in an age when religious pluralism is growing as a result of increased migration flows and the growth of ‘new religious movements’ of
different kinds, religious-cultural differences can resonate and aggravate other, more threatening conflicts. A sense of marginality or exclusion on the part of religious-cultural groups
should on this view be taken seriously and addressed.”).
180.
Mehmet Fevzi Bilgin, Political Liberalism and Inclusion of Religion, 7
RUTGERS J.L. & RELIGION 7, 4 (2006) (“Rawls’s idea of political liberalism stands for a
normative account of a fair and stable ground of political association among individuals who
espouse different religious, moral, and philosophical world views.”).
181.
Id. at 13 (footnotes omitted). See also id. at 23 (“Political liberalism does propose that people continue to value their religious, moral, and philosophical views, and that
they also engage in social cooperation defined by fair terms of cooperation acceptable to all.
People might have different reasons to endorse those terms, but as long as they can do so in
light of their religious views, it would extend the stability of the public order.” (footnotes
omitted)).
182.
Machado, supra note 4, at 454 (“The right to religious freedom and the duty to
tolerate religious diversity, to the extent they impose significant limitations in the internal
and external sovereignty of States, are important foundations of modern constitutional and
international law, peace and security.”).
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example, leaders of the church hierarchy may benefit financially where
their salaries are paid by the state and may welcome state financial support
of the organizations they are spearheading. Religious leaders may also
wield strong influence over governmental laws and policies.183 In some
countries, religious officials hold particular offices within the government.184 Religious entities may take political stances influencing governmental laws and policies and may attempt to sway the political process and
elections of state officials.185 Similarly, government officials may want to
control the state church so they can shape and direct the church’s theological doctrines, societal authority, and political influence. Additionally,
through a symbiotic relationship, government officials may benefit from the
backing of church leaders, who bolster the officials in return for the officials’ support of the church.186 Yet the personal or political benefits that the
establishment of religion may bring to some people are not a sufficient justification for continuing the violation of religious rights and other human
rights that such an arrangement inflicts.
Many of these issues raise questions as to what is, and what should be,
the purpose of government in a pluralistic and democratic state. Some political theorists focus on the goals of the state as ensuring justice, fairness,
freedom, and equality under the law.187 These aims will help the state promote stability by fostering commonly shared respect for the system of gov183.
See generally Robert C. Blitt, Russia’s “Orthodox” Foreign Policy: The Growing Influence of the Russian Orthodox Church in Shaping Russia’s Policies Abroad, 33 U.
PA. J. INT’L L. 363 (2011).
184.
Lekhel, supra note 76, at 189 n.128 (“For example, 26 senior Anglican Bishops
sit in the House of Lords and its institutional establishment continues even though only
sixteen percent of English population are actively religious, as opposed to forty-three percent
of Americans and seventy-eight percent of Irish.”).
185.
Garde, supra note 17, at 169 (“Undoubtedly the most controversial aspect of the
envisaged synod is the proposal to enable it to speak out on questions of general politics.”).
186.
See, e.g., Blitt, supra note 18, at 726 (“After the fall of the Soviet Union, in
Russia “the scales indicated an all too easy return to the symbiosis of the pre-Communist
era, a balance characterized by partnership and mutual benefit.”).
187.
P. Jones, The Ideal of the Neutral State, in LIBERAL NEUTRALITY 9, 11 (R.
Goodin & A. Reeve eds., 1989) (“[A] neutral state is seen as ‘one that deals impartially with
its citizens and which remains neutral on the issue of what sort of lives they should lead.’”
“[F]or many [neutrality] is to be regarded as ‘the defining feature of liberalism: a liberal
state is a state which imposes no conception of the good upon its citizens but which allows
individuals to pursue their own good in their own way.’”), quoted in Madeley, European
Liberal Democracy and the Principle of State Religious Neutrality, supra note 84, at 4-5.
This conceptualization derives from political philosophers such as John Stuart Mill, Emmanuel Kant, John Locke, John Rawls, Ronald Dworkin, and Bruce Ackerman. For example, according to Rawls’s “veil of ignorance” concept, the ideal system of government will
foster the state’s impartiality and equal treatment of its inhabitants. See also Machado, supra
note 4, at 512 (stating that separation of church and state is “derived from the values of equal
freedom and equal citizenship”).

374

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 34

ernment (even though not every person will agree with every outcome).188
The state must treat all citizens equally and without discrimination if it expects them to obey the law and to support the rule of law. Religious freedom is not possible in the context of a state religion but instead requires a
democratic framework that ensures political equality and popular sovereignty.189 Yet, as addressed above, any state religion inherently infringes
upon religious freedom. Countries recognizing official state religions “undermine[] the process by which a sociologically diverse society can become
a democratic, pluralist polity.”190
In the context of the relationship between the state and religion in a
pluralistic democracy, one can also consider the human rights implications
of the religious public square, versus the diverse public square, versus the
secular public square.191 With respect to the religious public square, some
people may want the public square to be devoted only to celebrating the
dominant religion within the country and, as noted above, may feel that
their religious rights would be violated if other religions received public
recognition or if the government did not give pride of place to their own
religion (let alone if the government ceased supporting religion entirely).192
However, international human rights documents do not provide for a right
to religious preference or domination, so, in effect, their religious rights
would not be diminished by antiestablishmentarianism—only their religious
privileges.

188.
Bilgin, supra note 180, at 4; Machado, supra note 4, at 452 (“The challenge of a
liberal constitutional democracy has always been to allow for the peaceful coexistence and
fair cooperation between people with different worldviews by offering some basic principles
of liberty, equality, reciprocity, justice and impartiality which can provide common ground
when agreement on the answers to the ultimate questions is not possible.”).
189.
Machado, supra note 4, at 456-57. (“The modern defense of religious freedom
is inseparable from the rise of freedom of conscience, freedom of speech, social contract
theory and popular sovereignty that were the cornerstones of modern liberal constitutionalism. The liberal constitutional understanding of religious freedom rests on the foundations
laid primarily by Roger Williams and John Locke.”).
190.
Ilesanmi, supra note 68, at 548.
191.
For a discussion of secularism and pluralism with respect to religion and human
rights, see generally Peter G. Danchin, Islam in the Secular Nomos of the European Court of
Human Rights, 32 MICH. J. INT’L L. 663 (2011). See also the discussion of different state
approaches in Temperman, supra note 25, at 7 (discussing approaches ranging “from secularity of the state, to state neutrality, to accommodation of religions, to active-yet-egalitarian
state support of religions, etc.”).
192.
Nancy L. Rosenblum, Pluralism, Integralism, and Political Theories of Religious Accommodation, in OBLIGATIONS OF CITIZENSHIP AND DEMANDS OF FAITH: RELIGIOUS
ACCOMMODATION IN PLURALIST DEMOCRACIES 3 (2000) (“Some believers charge that secular
democracy demonizes faith or offensively relegates it to the margins, demoting them to
‘second class citizens.’”).
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The diverse public square celebrates “a mosaic”193 of religious beliefs
(including those of agnostics and atheists). The fact that a state does not
proclaim an officially sanctioned state religion does not mean that religion
must be completely excluded from the public square.194 It could simply
mean that the state provides equal treatment to all belief systems and allows
all to flourish in the public realm.195 The state should neither persecute nor
privilege people who hold religious beliefs, neither should it persecute or
privilege people who hold non-religious beliefs; it should instead remain
neutral toward both religion and nonreligion.196 Proponents of this viewpoint may argue that the promotion of a pluralistic democracy “increases
public recognition of religious views.”197 They believe that governments
should not follow a “strict separationist model” but instead should allow
“all religious perspectives access to the public forums.”198 As long as a
governmental program does not “directly and impermissibly involve[] the
state in the internal affairs of a religious institution,” the government may
provide state aid that assists or advances religion.199
With respect to the secular public square, others may want the public
domain to be free from religion. They may feel that each individual’s religious beliefs are private and personal and can be celebrated communally
193.
Discussion by the delegation from Canada to the International Academy of
International Law’s 18th International Congress of Comparative Law, Session 2, General
Legal Theory: Religion and the Secular State, Georgetown University Law Center, Washington, D.C., attended by the author (July 29, 2010).
194.
Machado, supra note 4, at 495-502 (“[T]he principle of separation of Church
and State is not incompatible with a robust presence of religious speech in the sphere of
public discourse . . . . [It] was not premised on the assumption that religious discourse should
be deemed inferior to non-religious speech—and thus be totally removed from the public
square.”).
195.
For a discussion of religion in public life in the United States, particularly in
public schools, see Wexler, supra note 138, at 1161.
196.
Madeley, European Liberal Democracy and the Principle of State Religious
Neutrality, supra note 84, at 7 (“In defining neutrality, however, they adopted the consequentialist version as requiring that government ‘neither favour nor burden’ any particular
religion, or religion as a whole, or secular belief systems as a whole. ‘Governmental religious neutrality is attained when government does not influence its citizens’ choices for or
against certain religious or secular systems of belief, either by imposing burdens on them or
by granting advantages to them. Instead, government is neutral when it is evenhanded toward people of all faiths and of none.’” (footnotes omitted) (quoting S. MONSMA & C.
SOPER, THE CHALLENGE OF PLURALISM; CHURCH AND STATE IN FIVE DEMOCRACIES 6 (Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield 1997))).
197.
Bilgin, supra note 180, at 3 (“[P]olitical liberalism presents a neutral rather than
a secularist normative outlook. The logic of political liberalism . . . does not allow prioritization of secular views over religious views or vice versa.”).
198.
H. Wayne House, A Tale of Two Kingdoms: Can There be Peaceful Coexistence
of Religion with the Secular State?, 13 BYU J. PUB. L. 203, 286-89. (1999).
199.
Id. at 286-89.
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with other members of that religion within their religious entity but that
religion should not be a part of the civic sphere.200 Moreover, some scholars
assert that the structure of the state needs to remain neutral and unbiased;
the legal sphere should be impartial; and the state law must be kept free of
religious dogma.201 The state should not undertake activities that would
advance the religious precepts in the Bible, the Torah, the Quran, or any
other religious doctrine, although of course state policies will be influenced
by the values of its constituents that are inherently shaped by religion.202
Although opponents may counter with the argument that the state’s adoption of secularism would lead to restrictions on the presence of religion in
the public sphere, which, in their view, would be just as oppressive as privileging a particular religion,203 proponents of the secular public square perceive secularism as a means to ensure the protection of religious rights as
human rights—not as an end in and of itself.204 In this type of political system, the government does not affirmatively promote atheism or agnosticism, nor does it affirmatively promote religiosity (either of one religion or
of multiple religions) but instead remains neutral toward all belief systems.205

200.
Madeley, European Liberal Democracy and the Principle of State Religious
Neutrality, supra note 84, at 4-5 (“Enlightenment liberalism is presented as relying on three
interrelated assumptions: that particularistic religion could be safely assigned to the purely
private sphere without infringing on the religious beliefs and practices of its adherents, that a
public realm stripped of all its religious elements would be a neutral zone among the various
religious faith and between faith and non-belief, and that religious freedom would flourish in
the absence of governmental restraints and with no need for positive governmental actions to
equalize the advantages enjoyed by religious and nonreligious groups.” (footnotes omitted)).
201.
House, supra note 198, at 207-08.
202.
See generally STEVEN GOLDBERG, BLEACHED FAITH: THE TRAGIC COST WHEN
RELIGION IS FORCED INTO THE PUBLIC SQUARE 2, I (2008). (“It is a sign of weakness—an
admission that religion needs artificial life support—to push religious symbols into the
smothering embrace of government. If the push succeeds, religion is weakened further when
it is distorted to fit governmental desires.”).
203.
Bilgin, supra note 180, at 3.
204.
Id. at 27 (“Neutrality is frequently charged with a secular bias; it is meant to
refer to a ground of political justification impartial to diverse religions, which is characteristically defined not only as nonreligious but also as secularist in character. One widely accepted meaning of the church and state separation draws on this logic. This view holds that
in the wake of religious wars and conflicting religious doctrines, maintaining peace, order,
and stability in the society requires the state not to uphold any religion or pursue any religious goal. In this respect, the state becomes secular (i.e. not serving any religious purpose
or non-religious). But at times this logic is pushed further and is turned into an ideological
instrument against religion. I call this a secularist position. Broadly, the difference between a
secular state and a secularist state is that the former is non-religious, impartial, and perhaps
neutral whereas the latter is anti-religious or at least partial toward religion in general.”).
205.
For interesting examination of some of these questions, see Bilgin, supra note
180, at 3.
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The purpose of this Article is not to resolve the debate between the diverse public square and the secular public square. Instead, it simply argues
that the religious public square—meaning the establishment of an official
state religion by the government—contravenes religious rights protected
under the international human rights framework and causes other significant problems. Therefore, the international community and all governments
that purport to respect human rights should embrace antiestablishmentarianism.

IV. THE FAILURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
COMMUNITY TO RECOGNIZE ANTIESTABLISHMENTARIANISM AS A
NECESSARY PREREQUISITE TO RELIGIOUS RIGHTS
This Article questions whether the full constellation of human rights
embodied in the international and regional human rights treaties can truly
be respected in a country with a state religion.206 As demonstrated above,
despite the benefits that an established church may bring to certain individuals, state religions infringe upon a myriad of internationally recognized
human rights and pose additional concerns. As noted previously, many
countries confer special benefits upon their official religion, and even if the
state takes no other actions, the simple declaration that the state officially
sanctions one religion above all others is problematic. The main issue addressed in this Article is that state religions have not yet been recognized as
violating human rights under the international human rights framework.207
So far this practice and its discriminatory implications against both nonadherents and adherents to the state religion have not been consistently censured by international human rights entities.208 Instead, violations of religious rights have been challenged haphazardly, e.g., where children’s and
parents’ rights are violated by mandatory religious education in public
schools. This section of the Article considers why the international human
rights community has yet to embrace antiestablishmentarianism, proposes
206.
Witte, supra note 43, at 766 (“To cooperate or to separate, to aid or to avoid one
another, is a fundamental question that will confront religions and states around the world
with increasing urgency in this new century.”).
207.
Lekhel, supra note 76, at 203 (“Although the principle of denominational equality inspires the international religious rights regime, many other members of the Council of
Europe have a favored religion in either the endorsement or establishment models. Therefore, a special recognition of the [Russian] Orthodox Church does not appear to contradict
international practice.”); Id. at 203 n.200 (“For example, state churches exist in England,
Denmark, and Sweden.”).
208.
Id. at 230 (“[T]he Court of Human Rights is likely to be more receptive to a
claim that focuses on a specific, arbitrary denial of essential religious rights to some organizations under Article 27(3), instead of invalidating the general endorsement of traditional
religions and the Orthodoxy.”).
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that it should begin to do so, and suggests that the disestablishment of state
religions is a necessary prerequisite to ensuring fully the religious rights of
all people.
Despite the above concerns about state religions, none of the international human rights documents explicitly include the concept of antiestablishmentarianism as a necessary precondition to ensuring the full protection
of religious rights. Considering the fact that forty percent of countries in
2000 had official state religions and that the international human rights instruments were drafted largely by consensus, including by many of those
countries, it is understandable that no international human rights instrument
explicitly finds state religions to be problematic in light of this historical
context.209 In fact, at least one human rights instrument explicitly indicates
that state religions will not be questioned.210
More troubling is the fact that none of the international bodies overseeing the implementation of the human rights treaties have confronted this
issue head-on, although several have raised questions and concerns about
official state religions. According to Jónatas Machado, “[t]he main purpose
of the international community is to see that this right [to freedom of religion] be recognized and protected for every individual by every State within a democratic legal system of fundamental rights protecting free and equal
citizens.”211 Yet these entities have exhibited a disinclination to interpret the
instruments as necessitating disestablishment. They have not yet gone so far
as to affirm conclusively that the religious rights clauses in international
instruments require the separation of church and state. Indeed, a previous
Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief has explicitly indicated that a state religion per se does not violate human rights.212
This reluctance to question the validity of a state religion is perhaps
not surprising, since the entities monitoring implementation of the treaties
209.
E.g., Evans & Thomas, supra note 21, at 706 (discussing the historical context
in which the European Convention was drafted as in part responsible for its failure to mandate the separation of church and state).
210.
Madeley, European Liberal Democracy and the Principle of State Religious
Neutrality, supra note 84, at n.54 (“Declaration 11 ‘on the status of churches and nonconfessional organizations’ appended to the Treaty of Amsterdam reads: ‘The European
Union respects and does not prejudice the status under national law of churches and religious
associations or communities in the Member States. The European Union equally respects the
status of philosophical and non-confessional organizations.’ ‘Declarations annexed to final
act of Amsterdam’, Eur-Lex: Selected Instruments taken from the Treaties.”).
211.
Machado, supra note 4, at 467.
212.
See U.N. Secretary-General, Rapporteur Report on the Country Visit to Pakistan, ¶ 81, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1996/95/Add.1 (Jan. 2, 1996), available at http://daccess-ddsny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G96/100/03/PDF/G9610003.pdf?OpenElement (“[T]he Special Rapporteur would like to point out that an official or State religion in itself is not opposed to human rights.”).

2014]

RETHINKING THE VALIDITY OF STATE RELIGION

379

are comprised of representatives from a wide range of states, including
those maintaining state religions.213 Therefore, the unwillingness of the
international human rights bodies to promote antiestablishmentarianism
may, in large part, simply reflect this political reality. Auspiciously, they
are getting closer to critiquing state religions by highlighting in a piecemeal
fashion various violations of religious rights that countries with official
state religions may cause.214 Yet the fact that these bodies have not directly
indicated that the establishment of a state religion per se is problematic has
enabled them to be somewhat inconsistent in their application of human
rights norms, thus undermining the legitimacy of the human rights system
as a whole.
The Human Rights Committee, which oversees implementation of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, has recognized that
state religions may lead to human rights violations. The Committee has
interpreted ICCPR as requiring that
[T]he fact that a religion is recognized as a State
religion or that it is established as official or traditional or that its followers comprise the majority of
the population shall not result in any impairment of
the enjoyment of any of the rights under the Covenant . . . nor in any discrimination against adherents to other religions or non-believers.215
However, this statement does not rise to the level of an assertion that
the very fact that a nation has a state religion, in and of itself, is a violation
of the international human rights framework.216 Neither is it an express call
for the disestablishment of state religions as a precondition for the fulfillment of religious rights.
The Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief, Asma Jahangir, in her 2007 report to the UN Human Rights Council, has come a bit
closer to challenging the validity of a state religion. Yet she hedged her
statement and did not expressly indicate that state religions inherently violate religious rights. She cautioned:

213.
Temperman, supra note 25, at 8.
214.
Id. at 19-20.
215.
See U.N. Human Rights Committee, CCPR General Comment No. 22: Article
18 (Freedom of Thought, Conscience or Religion), U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.4
(July 30, 1993), available at
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.4.
216.
Temperman, supra note 25, at 8 (“Clearly, the Human Rights Committee in this
General Comment does not condemn establishment of religion per se.”).
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The notion of an official or State religion must
never be exploited at the expense of the rights of
minorities . . . . Formal or legal distinctions between different kinds of religious or faith-based
communities carry the seed of discrimination insofar as such a distinction in their status implies a difference in rights or treatment. Consequently . . .
the legalization of such a distinction between different categories of religion is liable to pave the
way for future violations of the right to freedom of
religion or for discrimination on the basis of religion or belief.217
In another report, she tentatively began to question the validity of a
state religion under the international human rights framework, without taking on the issue directly, stating:
Without addressing the question of whether a
“State religion” is a system that is compatible with
human rights, the Special Rapporteur has noted
that in a few States, legislation has been adopted
that recognizes certain religions and not others or
that institutes a different status among certain categories of religions . . . [T]he legalization of a distinction between different categories of religion is
liable to pave the way for future violations of the
right to freedom of religion or for discrimination
on the basis of religion or belief.218

217.
U.N. Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Freedom of
Religion or Belief, ¶ 26, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/6/5 (July 20, 2007) (emphasis added).
218.
Economics and Social Council, Report submitted by Asma Jahangir, Special
Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief, ¶ 61, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2005/61 (Dec. 20,
2004), available at http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=E/CN.4/2005/61.
See also Machado, supra note 4, at 511 n.246 (“In the [c]ase of the European Court of Human Rights . . . the strategy seems to be the elimination of the most serious forms of religious persecution and discrimination, while deferring to the essential features of national
establishments, by means of the application of the margin of appreciation doctrine.”). Notably, the most recent person to hold the position of Special Rapporteur, Heiner Bielefeldt, has
indicated: “Indeed, it seems difficult, if not impossible, to conceive of an application of the
concept of an official ‘State religion’ that in practice does not have adverse effects on religious minorities, thus discriminating against their members.” Report of the Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief, A/HRC/10/60 (2011), 18; cited in Temperman, supra
note 25, at 1, 19-20. Again, although this statement walks very close to the line of condemning state religions, it does not expressly call for the abolition of all state religions.
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The fact that she did not criticize the establishment of religion directly is
perhaps not surprising. She must choose her battles carefully, as her position is subject to the same political pressures to which all international positions are subject.
Additionally, regional human rights bodies have not condemned state
religions as violating regional human rights instruments.219 In fact, the European Commission on Human Rights has determined expressly that the
establishment of an official state religion does not per se violate the European Convention.220 The European Court of Human Rights has upheld state
restrictions that are clearly discriminatory in favor of certain religions.221
For example, it permitted state restrictions on freedom of expression in cases challenging blasphemy laws in England, which only prohibit blasphemy
against Christianity or the Church of England and in Austria, which only
prohibit blasphemy against Christianity.222 As another example, in describing a government-commissioned report on the state church in Norway, one
scholar has noted:

219.
Lekhel, supra note 76, at 186-87 (“The European Court of Human Rights explicitly assented to the proposition that the State Church system does not, in and of itself,
violate Article 9 of the Convention, and has repeatedly shown institutional bias in favor of
traditional religions. Although religious policies of certain Western European states also
evoked the sharp criticism of observers, the specialists agree that cooperative and endorsed
models of church-state relations generally achieve international religious liberty standards.”
(footnotes omitted)). Garde, supra note 17, at 153 (stating that although a judge on the European Court of Human Rights indicated that “under the Convention all religions and beliefs
should, as far as the State is concerned, be equal,” that statement “cannot be cited in support
of a view that . . . the existence of an established church, which was not the issue—violate[s]
the Convention”).
220.
Evans & Thomas, supra note 21, at 706, 707 (quoting Darby v. Sweden, App.
No. 11581/85, 31 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 1 (1989) (Commission report)) (“A State
Church system cannot in itself be considered to violate article 9 of the Convention. In fact,
such a system exists in several Contracting States and existed there already when the Convention was drafted and when they became parties to it.”).
221. Ruti Teitel, Militating Democracy: Comparative Constitutional Perspectives, 29
MICH. J. INT'L L. 49, 56 (2007) (“Similarly, in a case brought against the United Kingdom,
the European Court of Human Rights deferred to the State in a case in which an eighteenminute video, Visions of Ecstasy, was said to constitute blasphemy. The Court held that ‘a
wider margin of appreciation is generally available to Contracting States when regulating
freedom of expression in relation to matters liable to offend intimate personal convictions
within the sphere of morals or, especially, religion.’ The Court came to this conclusion
despite the fact that in the case of this particular statute, the underlying value at stake could
not so easily be said to imply religious peace or tolerance. In the U.K. statute, blasphemy
was defined only with respect to expression of offensiveness to Christian religious
sensibilities; here then, the Court was clearly privileging majoritarian community values.”
(footnotes omitted) (quoting Wingrove v. United Kingdom, 1996-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 1938
(noting that the law “only extends to the Christian faith”))).
222.
Id.
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The ensuing report remarked that the existing system probably did not violate the European Convention, and quoted with approval an author stressing
the improbability that the state churches in the
Nordic countries and Great Britain should be regarded as violations at the moment of these countries’ accession to the Convention, but also remarking that it could not be regarded as impossible that
the Convention might at a later stage be interpreted
differently.223
Although in recent years the European Court of Human Rights may implicitly be leaning toward a doctrine of antiestablishmentarianism,224 it has yet
to affirm this principle explicitly. Moreover, some legal scholars have explicitly affirmed their view that state religions themselves pose no problems
under the current international human rights framework (while acknowledging that certain government actions regarding the state religion may be
problematic).225 For example, Peter Garde has written:
In Denmark, the first big treatise on human rights
remarked that it could be argued that the very existence of an established church is contrary to Human Rights, esp. art. 9 of the European Convention, but answered the question in the negative
provided that the negative freedom of conscience
was respected. I agree.226

223.
Garde, supra note 17, at 173.
224.
Claudia E. Haupt, Transnational Nonestablishment, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
991, 995 (2012).
225.
Rex Ahdar & Ian Leigh, Is Establishment Consistent with Religious Freedom?,
in RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN THE LIBERAL STATE 127-54 (2005); Octavio Lo Prete, The Protection of Religious Freedom by the National Constitution and by Human Rights Treaties in the
Republic of Argentina, 2009 BYU L. REV. 673, 676-77 (“The Constitution has always mandated that the national government sustain the Catholic Church. It also has always guaranteed religious freedom. These sections are not contradictory because the Government can
sustain a church without denying others their religious freedoms.”). See also Gerhard Robbers, Diversity of State-Religion Relations and European Union Unity, 7(34)
ECCLESIASTICAL L.J. 304, 312-13 (2004) (finding no problem with the establishment of an
official state religion: “The European Union respects and does not prejudice the legal status
of Churches and religious and philosophical communities which they enjoy under the law of
a Member State.” “The very example of the Member States [of the European Union] shows:
it is not necessary to install just one system—and it would not be wise. We can keep variety.”).
226.
L.A. Rehoe & T. Trier, Menneskeret, HUM. RTS. 277 (1990), cited in Garde,
supra note 17, at 174.
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Some scholars conclude that the historical context in which human rights
treaties were drafted and adopted, including by countries maintaining an
official state religion, means that those treaties “should not be interpreted as
an absolute prohibition on establishment.”227 Others discuss more theoretical reasons for permitting various forms of state establishment of religion.228 In response to those stances, this Article suggests that, since the
establishment of religion, in itself, violates religious rights that are explicitly protected in the international human rights instruments, they should be
recognized as prohibiting state religions.
One might argue that international human rights entities, human rights
organizations, and scholars should concern themselves with more severe
and pressing human rights violations, such as forced conversions or the
persecution of religious minorities, rather than more benign forms of discrimination, such as greater financial or other support for the state religion
than for minority religions.229 On the other hand, state support for certain
religions at the expense of others is a hotly contested issue in some countries.230 These problems, and similar controversies that state religions inevitably cause, should not be ignored by human rights bodies. Furthermore, to
avoid the charge of hypocrisy, the human rights community should highlight human rights violations wherever they occur and not simply limit their
recriminations to less-favored states.
The infringements upon religious rights caused by state religions, coupled with the international human rights community’s reluctance to address
this issue, demonstrate the need for a direct call for antiestablishmentarianism. Thus far, the international human rights community has only addressed
the human rights violations engendered by state religions in an ad hoc fashion, without challenging the institution of state religions as a whole. They
227.
Evans & Thomas, supra note 21, at 706, 713-19 (discussing, with seeming
approval, the European Court of Human Rights view that state-sponsored financial assistance for religions, state-sponsored educational assistance for religions, state benefits and
privileges that are provided discriminatorily to one religion and not to others, and state control over the established church, are not necessarily violations of religious rights or other
human rights). See also Temperman, supra note 25, at 2.
228.
See generally, Gidon Sapir, Religion and State – A Fresh Theoretical Start, 75
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 579, 621 (1999) (“[T]here is no reason to prevent the state from
providing religion preferential treatment.”); Id. at 651 (“[T]he model I have proposed . . .
permits a state to go well beyond strict neutrality toward religion . . . . The state is merely
required to avoid the coercive establishment of . . . religion.”) (emphasis added)).
229.
See, e.g., Jost, supra note 165, at 1011 (discussing issues such as “villages being
bombed, children taken away to slavery, prisoners and refugees denied food or other humanitarian assistance,” as well as houses of worship being destroyed, clergy being imprisoned or
murdered, and other atrocities); Temperman, supra note 25, at 23 (“Establishmentarians’
ultimate rebuttal in the face of a principled critique of establishment may well be: are there
not more important issues to worry about?”).
230.
For example, government support for religious schools in Canada.
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are only dealing with symptoms of the problem, not squarely addressing the
root of the problem, which is the establishment of religion. They have not
recognized that the very fact that a nation has a state religion is, in and of
itself, a violation of the international human rights framework. Nor have
they expressly called for disestablishment of state religions as a precondition for the fulfillment of religious rights. As demonstrated by the examples
in this Article, the fact that the government has established an official state
religion violates human rights norms, and the violation will not stop until
the state disestablishes its ties to the official religion. It is time for the international human rights community to acknowledge this. Therefore, this Article contains a call for the oversight bodies explicitly to recognize the violations of religious rights inherent in any state religion and to confirm unequivocally that antiestablishmentarianism is a necessary prerequisite for the
protection of religious rights under the international human rights framework.

V. MOVING TOWARD THE RECOGNITION OF
ANTIESTABLISHMENTARIANISM AS A FUNDAMENTAL HUMAN RIGHTS
DOCTRINE
Interestingly, some states have recently disestablished the relationship
between the state and the previously privileged religious entity. Bolivia
severed its official establishment with the Catholic Church in 2009.231 Nepal ceased proclaiming Hindu as the official state religion in 2006.232 Bhutan was officially a Buddhist state until 2008.233 Sweden ended the establishment of the Lutheran Church of Sweden as the state church in 2000.234
Although it does not explicitly prohibit establishment, the Canadian Charter
of Rights and Freedoms has been interpreted to preclude the establishment
of a state religion in Canada through its clauses guaranteeing equality and
religious freedom.235 Jónatas Machado has noted that “structural principles—free markets, fundamental rights, religious freedom, equal . . . citizenship and nondiscrimination—create strong systemic pressures towards
weakening, if not dismantling, existing religious establishments and privi-

231.
Department of State, International Religious Freedom Report: Bolivia at 2
(2009), http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/171769.pdf (referring to “the separation between church and state enunciated in the 2009 constitution”).
232.
W. Cole Durham, Jr., Patterns of Religion State Relations, in RELIGION &
HUMAN RIGHTS: AN INTRODUCTION 364 (John Witte, Jr. & M. Christian Green eds., 2012).
233.
Id. at 364.
234.
Id. at 365.
235.
Jeremy Patrick, Church, State, and Charter: Canada’s Hidden Establishment
Clause, 14 TULSA J. COMP. & INT’L L. 25, 27 (2006).
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leges.”236 In her recent article, Claudia Haupt “argues that an emerging
trend toward a transnational nonestablishment principle seems to be developing in contemporary Europe.”237 Looking at longer-range historical
trends, the study discussed at the beginning of this Article demonstrated
that although fifty-nine percent of 188 countries maintained state religions
in 1900, this number decreased by nearly a third to forty percent in 2000.238
In light of these factors, the international community may be poised at the
beginning of a trend toward disestablishment that will help the international
human rights bodies gain the courage to advocate for antiestablishmentarianism.
One approach to encouraging the international human rights bodies directly to confront state religions could be a test case brought by a nongovernmental organization in one of the regional human rights bodies, challenging the establishment of religion directly (as opposed to challenging
only a particular manifestation of a state religion that clearly violates human rights). Of course, the human rights bodies could continue to avoid the
central question in deciding the case and instead focus on specific aspects
of the state religion that are the most problematic. On the other hand, if the
government challenged in the lawsuit was already considering the possibility of disestablishment, and the popular sentiment within that country largely supported disestablishment (or at least a large segment of the population
was neutral with respect to this issue), then the human rights entity might be
willing to engage with the question of antiestablishmentarianism. Most likely it would receive a tremendous amount of pressure from governments and
religious entities not directly involved in the lawsuit but with a stake in the
outcome of the case and in the reasoning that the human rights body used in
approaching the lawsuit. But at least the conversation about antiestablishmentarianism would be advanced in the international community, which
will keep the issue on the table.
Perhaps the international community should continue exploring the
idea of an international treaty on religious rights, in which antiestablishmentarianism could be a central principle.239 No comprehensive international treaty currently exists that specifically deals with religious rights as
human rights. Quite often, declarations adopted by the United Nations General Assembly are subsequently turned into legally binding treaties containing more specificity in the details of the rights to be protected by state governments and an oversight body to encourage countries to take steps toward
236.
237.
238.
239.
123-24.

Machado, supra note 4, at 511.
Haupt, supra note 224, at 991.
Barro & McClearly, supra note 6, at 7.
LERNER, RELIGION, SECULAR BELIEFS,

AND

HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 40, at
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full compliance. The Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief was adopted in
1981, so a treaty on this issue could be considered long overdue. However,
this approach may raise some additional concerns, especially in the current
climate where various religious entities have adopted a fundamentalist
stance, so this suggestion might not be viable at the present time. For example, certain prominent religious entities have attempted to persuade the
United Nations to adopt measures that would protect religions against
speech challenging those religions, which could shut down dialogue that
questions the truth of religions, thus leading to greater religious intolerance.240 Some scholars believe it is prudent not to pursue a comprehensive
religious rights treaty at this time but instead advocate for stronger enforcement of provisions protecting religious rights in existing treaties and
other instruments.241 Therefore, developing consensus on an international
human rights treaty addressing religious rights may have to wait a while
longer.
As is well known in the context of United States constitutional law and
history, antiestablishmentarianism has developed into an essential foundation of religious rights in the United States under the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the First Amendment.242 Thomas Jefferson, and other founders who adopted the Establishment Clause in the First Amendment, were
perceptive in understanding the need for the separation of church and state
to preserve religious rights and were prescient in foreshadowing the global
movement toward disestablishment.243 In 1785, James Madison wrote the
240.
241.
242.

Id. at 133.
Id. at 123-27, 132.
LEONARD W. LEVY, THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE: RELIGION AND THE FIRST
AMENDMENT, at xiv (2nd ed. 1994) (“The establishment clause separates government and
religion so that we can maintain civility between believers and unbelievers as well as among
the several hundred denominations, sects, and cults that thrive in our nation, all sharing the
commitment to liberty and equality that cements us together.”); House, supra note 198, at
205. See generally Harlan M. Goulett, God Hath Created the Mind Free: Toward a Jeffersonian Theory of Rights, 37 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 984 (2004). Machado, supra note 4, at 45960 (“[Locke’s] basic understanding of the voluntary nature of individual and institutional
religious life certainly influenced the Founding Fathers of the American Republic and their
constitutional project. The need to protect the free exercise of religion and to separate the
State from the Church was recognized by the First Amendment to the Federal Constitution
of the United States in 1791.”). See also “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” U.S. CONST. amend. I.
243.
See generally THE SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE , supra note 2, at vii-159.
But see Reid, supra note 73, at 374 (noting “that the drafting and adoption of the First
Amendment’s protection of religious liberty must not be seen as the triumph of a tolerant
secular world view over an intolerant religious one: James Madison—who was chiefly responsible for articulating the ideals embodied in the First Amendment-was a religious believer who sought to enshrine his peculiar religious insights in the Constitution of the United
States. Thus . . . the First Amendment’s protection of religious liberty was itself the product
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influential “Memorial and Remonstrance against Religious Assessments,”
which provided a powerful argument opposing the government’s establishment of religion.244 The First Amendment was adopted in large part as a
reaction to the religious persecution and lack of religious freedom the colonists had previously experienced in their countries of origin.245 The United
States government’s stance toward religion, including its historical evolution arising out of European religious oppression, can be seen as a largely
successful experiment at the federal level.246 In spite of, or perhaps as a
result of, the nonestablishment of religion in the United States, religion in
this country has flourished.247 Of course, the precise contours of the establishment clause are still hotly contested within the United States.248 Debates
continue about whether the government should provide equal aid versus no
aid to religious entities249 and whether private choices should determine
how government aid can be used versus whether government aid must not
be used to support religious activities at all.250 Additional issues in the Unitof theological insight and reflection”). See generally JOHN RAGOSTA, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM:
JEFFERSON’S LEGACY, AMERICA’S CREED (2013).
244.
THE SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE, supra note 2, at 56-69; Reid, supra
note 73, at 410-25.
245.
House, supra note 198, at 204. See generally Goulett, supra note 242. Unfortunately, many of those coming to the “new world” to escape religious persecution subsequently inflicted similar transgressions upon others who did not share their religious beliefs—such as indigenous populations and other immigrants adhering to different creeds. See
Reid, supra note 73, at 54 (quoting JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., THE LUSTER OF OUR COUNTRY:
THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM (1998) (referencing religious persecution in the 17th century colonies, “neither the soil of America, nor the experience of having
suffered persecution, nor explicit belief in freedom of conscience were sufficient in themselves to prevent men [from] carrying out persecution on account of religion.”)).
246.
Machado, supra note 4, at 461. (“John Locke put forth an understanding of
religious freedom premised on the moral and rational autonomy of individuals, a value on
which both significant factions of evangelicals and Enlightenment rationalists could, to a
large extent, find common ground . . . . Thus, in the recently created United States of America, religious freedom and separation of Church and State, at least at a federal level, became
central principles of constitutional law recognized in the First Amendment to the United
States Constitution of 1787 with the support of rationalists like Thomas Jefferson and James
Madison, as well as some evangelical groups such as the Baptists. This, however, did not
eliminate all problems; in many cases, colonial and state life was full of religious bigotry and
persecution.”).
247.
House, supra note 198, at 205-206; Wexler, supra note 138, at 1161.
248.
See generally Robert A. Holland, A Theory of Establishment Clause Adjudication: Individualism, Social Contract, and the Significance of Coercion in Identifying Threats
to Religious Liberty, 80 CAL. L. REV. 1595 (1992); Barry W. Lynn, Religious Freedom: At a
Crossroads. 39 HUM. RTS. 2 (2013).
249.
See, e.g., the debate in the majority and minority opinions in Rosenberger v.
Rector of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995); Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
250.
See, e.g., Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002); Witters v. Wash.
Dep’t. of Servs., 474 U.S. 481 (1986); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983); Comm. for
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ed States include nativity scenes, the Ten Commandments, the Pledge of
Allegiance, government-employed chaplains, and, of course, currency proclaiming “In God We Trust.”251 Yet the fact that the full contours of the
doctrine of church-state separation have not entirely been settled in the
United States does not mean that antiestablishmentarianism should necessarily be rejected in its entirety by the international human rights community. Its core principles may also prove to be useful in an international context.252
One might ask what the practical distinction is between countries with
official state religions and those that are formally disestablished, such as the
United States.253 What does it mean that we cannot conceive of an atheist
U.S. president,254 or a U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops with no political power? A crucial response is that there is a distinction between people
who hold religious beliefs having an influence over governmental policies
and being members of the government themselves, on the one hand, as opposed to the government officially espousing a particular religion as the one
true religion, on the other. The question comes down to what is, and what
should be, the role of the state with respect to religion and human rights?
The disestablishment of religion will not resolve all issues regarding the
relationships between the state and religion. It will not, in and of itself, result in uniform tolerance of and respect for all religious beliefs by all people. Of course, tensions exist between various human rights. Disestablishment is necessary, but not sufficient, for achieving the protection of religious rights under international human rights principles. It will not solve all
of the problems surrounding church-state relationships. Other issues must
be addressed as well but are outside the scope of this Article.255 It simply
takes on one discrete, yet important, facet—whether or not a state may establish a religion without violating human rights—and asserts that this arPub. Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403
U.S. 602 (1971); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971).
251.
RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., THE DYNAMIC CONSTITUTION: AN INTRODUCTION TO
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE 77-99 (2nd ed. 2013).
252.
Madeley, A Framework for the Comparative Analysis of Church-State Relations
in Europe, supra note 5, at 18; Machado, supra note 4, at 470 (“[T]he United States Supreme Court has an important body of jurisprudence on religious freedom and church-state
relations that can provide national courts with important hermeneutic guidelines when interpreting relevant constitutional norms.”).
253.
For a history of the relationship between the church and state in Europe and its
heritage in the United States, as well as political philosophers and religious thinkers such as
John Locke and Roger Williams, see generally Reid, supra note 73.
254.
See also Machado, supra note 4, at 524 (discussing the possibility of a Muslim
running for president).
255.
Countries in which the state forbids religion do not have a problem with establishment, but they are also clearly in violation of religious rights. Some states have more
than one established religion (China has five), which is still problematic.
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rangement is inherently problematic. Antiestablishmentarianism is one step
in the right direction toward greater protection of religious rights for all
people.

VI. CONCLUSION
In summary, this Article explores the principle of antiestablishmentarianism and the need for states to adopt this principle in order to comply
fully with international human rights norms. If state religions inherently
pose human rights violations—and this Article argues that they do—this
circumstance suggests that no intermediate ground exists between establishment and disestablishment. The church and state must be separated in
order to protect religious rights. When one considers all of the manifestations of human rights violations noted above (as well as more egregious
violations in nations imposing state religions that this Article does not address), taken together, they suggest that the entwinement of church and
state will inevitably infringe upon human rights. As a practical matter, there
does not appear to be any state with an established religion that does not
raise these issues. As indicated above, even if the state only declares a state
religion and takes no further action, issues remain, since the state is providing its moral statement favoring the truth of one religion and opposing the
validity of other religions. The separation of church and state promotes religious rights for people who are not of the majority religion (e.g., regarding
public funding of sectarian schools, teaching religion in secular schools,
and so on), as well as religious rights for people who are of the majority
religion (e.g., regarding control of the religious entity’s property, control
over the leadership of the religious entity, control over religious doctrines,
and so on).
This Article establishes that religious rights will be better protected
once the international human rights community explicitly recognizes and
affirms the principle of antiestablishmentarianism as a necessary precondition for the protection of religious rights within the international human
rights framework. Disestablishment is required in order to protect religious
rights fully. Of course, one must take into consideration the practical realities that international human rights bodies face—that they can push states
only so far and only so fast. It may be understandable that, up to this point
in time, the international human rights bodies have deliberately chosen to
attenuate their language in questioning the compatibility of state religions
with human rights for valid practical and strategic reasons. However, this
Article urges them—and anyone else interested in advancing international
human rights—to raise the core issue whenever possible, directly probing
the validity of state religions per se, in addition to addressing the multiple
symptomatic problems that maintaining a state religion might raise. The
movement toward antiestablishmentarianism must start somewhere, and
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this is perhaps where scholars, non-governmental organizations, and others
can help initiate and lead the call for antiestablishmentarianism. Once
again, this Article concludes that religious rights are not capable of being
entirely fulfilled in countries maintaining a state religion and that antiestablishmentarianism is therefore a necessary prerequisite for protecting religious rights.

